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Article 
Litigating the Right to Health under Occupation: 
Between Bureaucracy and Humanitarianism 
Aeyal Gross 
INTRODUCTION 
The increasing role of litigation in the protection of the right 
to health has evoked great interest in recent years.1 In addition 
to the increase in domestic and international litigation,2 the 
examination of access to health care from a human rights 
perspective is also clearly rising.3 This growing attention to 
 
  Aeyal Gross is Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University. I am grateful to 
the World Health Organization for the funding for this research, to Dani Filc, 
Paul Hunt, Michal Luft, Yael Ronen, and Anita Vitullo for their comments on a 
previous draft of the article, and to Idan Seger for his excellent and dedicated 
research work. Special thanks to Physicians for Human Rights – Israel and 
especially to Mor Efrat for their help during the research. Special thanks to 
Batya Stein for her excellent editing work. Responsibility for all interpretations 
and translations of Israeli laws and cases remain with the author. 
 1. See COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. 
Brinks eds., 2008); LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE 
JUSTICE TO HEALTH? (Alicia Ely Yamin & Siri Gloppen eds., 2011); THE RIGHT 
TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 
(Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) [hereinafter 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH]; Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross, Litigating the Right 
to Health: What Can We Learn from a Comparative Law and Health Care 
Approach, 16 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 62 (2014); Aeyal Gross, The Right to 
Health in an Era of Privatization and Globalization: National and International 
Perspectives, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 289, 291 
(Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross, eds., Hart Publishing, 2007) [hereinafter 
The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and Globalization]; Hans V. 
Hogerzeil et al., Is Access to Essential Medicines as Part of the Fulfillment of the 
Right to Health Enforceable Through the Courts?, 368 LANCET 305 (2006); 
Symposium, Legislating and Litigating Health Care Rights Around the World, 
33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 636 (2005). 
 2. Regarding the right to health at the level of international law, see JOHN 
TOBIN, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); JONATHAN 
WOLFF, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 94 (2012); Susan Marks & Andrew 
Clapham, Health, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LEXICON 197 (2005). 
 3. For a description of the processes involved in the growing turn to the 
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litigation has focused on access to health care within domestic 
settings, raising questions about the setting of priorities, 
rationing, decision-making, and so forth. 
This Article looks at another context of litigation, involving 
residents of an occupied territory in the courts of law of the 
occupying power. Specifically, it considers the right to health of 
Palestinians from the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) as 
discussed in Israeli courts, a setting distinct from the discussion 
in the current literature on health rights litigation—one that 
raises unique questions. 
This Article begins with the frame of its discussion. First, 
the OPT is defined as including the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. After the Israeli “disengagement” in 2005, questions about 
the status of the Gaza Strip and whether it is still occupied have 
been a controversial subject. This Article uses the approach 
developed in the Author’s other writings: so long as Israel 
exercises even partial control over Gaza, it continues to be 
responsible as the occupier, at least functionally, for all matters 
over which it has control.4 As for East Jerusalem, although 
Israel has extended its law, administration, and jurisdiction to 
it,5 this unilateral annexation has not been internationally 
recognized and the area is considered part of the OPT, despite 
its sui generis situation as the only place in the OPT where 
Israeli law is applied to Palestinians. This Article will, therefore, 
address some cases regarding East Jerusalem, notwithstanding 
the different legal framework. 
Even within the West Bank, however, the operation of the 
 
right to health and the reasons for them, see Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross, 
Marrying Human Rights and Health Care Systems: Contexts for Power to 
Improve Access and Equity, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, supra note 1, at 2–4. 
 4. For a detailed discussion of the debate regarding Gaza and for an 
elaboration of the functional approach, see AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE 
WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 52–264 (2017). 
See also Aeyal Gross, Rethinking Occupation: The Functional Approach, OPINIO 
JURIS (Apr. 23, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/23/rethinking-occupation-
the-functional-approach. The ICRC has recently adapted a limited version of a 
functional approach. Int’l. Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Commentary on the 
First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd edition, 2016, ¶¶ 
116–23 (Mar. 22, 2016). See also (Re)-Introducing the Functional Approach to 
Occupation, GAZA GATEWAY (Dec. 15, 2015), http://gisha.org/en-blog/2015/12/
15/re-introducing-the-functional-approach-to-occupation/. 
 5. See Law and Administration Order (no.1), 5727–1967, KT 2064 p. 2690 
(Isr.). See also Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 5740–1980, SH No. 980 
p. 186. For a discussion, see EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
OCCUPATION, 203–06 (2012). 
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Palestinian Authority (PA) alongside Israel, the occupying 
power, complicates the situation. Health is one of the matters 
that are generally under PA jurisdiction. While his article does 
not deal with the period that preceded the Oslo Agreements 
(1967–1994) when Israel, as occupier, administered significant 
aspects of the health care system in the OPT directly,6 some of 
the patterns from that period, however, are still relevant and 
deserve mention. One is the creation of two different standards 
of care—one for Israeli settlers who have access to the Israeli 
health care system, and a separate, substandard for 
Palestinians in the OPT.7 In the latter, the emphasis is on access 
to public health and a certain level of primary care, with more 
expensive tertiary care provided by Israeli hospitals on a limited 
scale. This creates ongoing dependence on Israel for 
sophisticated forms of treatment. Since patients require the 
approval of the Israeli secret service to enter Israel for health 
care, the need to refer Palestinian patients for treatment to 
Israel has turned into an instrument of control for the 
occupation forces.8 
The shift in the context of health is part of a more general 
shift in the patterns of the Israeli occupation in the wake of the 
Oslo accords—maintaining control while bearing less 
responsibility.9 Dani Filc, a politics and government professor at 
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, points out the problematic 
nature of the agreement that transferred health care 
responsibilities from Israel to the PA.10 The PA was made 
responsible for health care, but Israel retained power and 
authority over elements crucial to it, such as freedom of 
 
 6. For a discussion of this period, see Neve Gordon & Dani Filc, The 
Destruction of Risk Society and the Ascendancy of Hamas, in THE POWER OF 
INCLUSIVE EXCLUSION: ANATOMY OF ISRAELI RULE IN THE OCCUPIED 
PALESTINE TERRITORIES 457, 461–66 (Adi Ophir et al. eds., 2009); Yithak Sever 
& Yitzhak Peterburg, Israel’s Development and Provision of Health Services to 
the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 1967-1994, in SEPARATE AND 
COOPERATE, COOPERATE AND SEPARATE: THE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE 
PALESTINE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FROM ISRAEL AND ITS EMERGENCE AS AN 
INDEPENDENT SYSTEM 41–56 (Tamara Barnea & Rafiq Husseini eds., 2002); 
HADAS ZIV, A LEGACY OF INJUSTICE 20–25 (Shaul Miri Weingarten ed., Vardi 
& Miri Weingarten trans., 2002), http://cdn4.phr.org.il/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/A-Legacy-of-Injustice.pdf. 
 7. DANI FILC, CIRCLES OF EXCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE IN 
ISRAEL 132 (2009). 
 8. Id. at 133–34. 
 9. See GROSS, supra note 4, at 136–264. 
 10. FILC, supra note 7, at 152. 
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movement both within the West Bank and Gaza and between 
these two parts of the OPT.11 
This situation, as Filc notes, left the PA with limited powers 
regarding the movement of patients as well as other issues such 
as, for example, the determination of venues for Palestinian 
doctors to specialize.12 Filc argues that the Ministry of Health 
established under the PA lacked the resources and the political 
power necessary for replacing the fragmented health system 
inherited from the Israeli occupation and tried instead to become 
a regulator.13 As a result of the legacy of the occupation and of 
policies adopted by the PA, Palestinians in the OPT remained 
dependent on Israel and other countries for the provision of 
tertiary health care. This dependence entailed dire 
consequences, especially with the growing restrictions that have 
been placed on freedom of movement since the Second Intifada 
in the early 2000s.14 Other such restrictions, especially in 
relation to the separation of Gaza from the West Bank and of 
both the West Bank and Gaza from East Jerusalem, are still an 
issue at present. In the Oslo agreement, Israel also ensured that 
the PA would bear exclusive responsibility for funding the 
hospitalization of Palestinian patients in Israel.15 
The Palestinian health system has been described as being 
“in a state of chronic crisis,” with shortages of medication and 
medical equipment alongside a shortfall in specialist doctors and 
medical staff in general.16 The ways that Israeli control over the 
OPT is related to this crisis have been documented and will not 
be analyzed here in detail.17 Emphasis should be placed, 
however, on the Palestinian health system’s economic 
dependence on Israel, which results from the continued Israeli 
control of Palestinian tax money as well as on other, more 
specific, factors: the dependence on referrals to Israel,18 Israel’s 
control of the pharmaceutical market through economic 
 
 11. Id. For a discussion of the health arrangements under the Oslo Acoords, 
see Gordon & Filc, supra note 6, at 466–67. See also ZIV, supra note 6, at 26-37. 
 12. FILC, supra note 7, at 138–39. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 139–40; 143–46. 
 15. ZIV, supra note 6, at 31. 
 16. MON EFRAT, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS – ISRAEL, DIVIDE & 
CONQUER: INEQUALITY IN HEALTH 7 (Reut Katz ed., G. Daniel & Dena Bugel-
Shunra trans., 2015), http://cdn3.phr.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Divide-
And-Conquer.pdf. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. at 42–43. 
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agreements,19 limitations on the development of Palestinian 
medical professionals by denying students entry to Jerusalem 
for clinical training,20 and quotas on teams from the West Bank 
allowed to work in East Jerusalem.21 Further factors are the 
limitations on patient mobility,22 discussed below in detail, as 
well as on ambulance mobility23 and, more generally, the effects 
of violence and imprisonment on the health of Palestinians.24 
This Article only addresses issues touching on access to 
health care, although this aspect does certainly not exhaust the 
right to health.25 The “medicalization” of the right to health, 
referring to the focus on health care rather than on social 
determinants of health such as education, nutrition, and 
housing, has indeed been criticized.26 Nonetheless, this Article 
will not address important issues that are not directly related to 
access to health care, such as the effects of the occupation’s 
discriminatory policies and the stress on more general 
determinants of OPT residents’ health.27 Although those 
questions are obviously critical, this Article is not an exhaustive 
 
 19. Id. at 44–45. See ORLY ALMI, WHO PROFITS, CAPTIVE ECONOMY: THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION (2012), 
http://www.whoprofits.org/sites/default/files/captive_economy_0.pdf. 
 20. EFRAT, supra note 16, at 45–47. 
 21. Id. at 46–47. 
 22. See id. at 47–48. 
 23. See id. at 48–49. 
 24. See id. at 50–51. 
 25. See The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and Globalization, 
supra note 1. 
 26. To look at “medicalization” in this context, see Benjamin M. Meier, The 
World Health Organization, the Evolution of Human Rights, and the Failure to 
Achieve Health for All, in GLOBAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, 163–89 (John Harrington & Maria Stuttaford 
eds., 2010). For the discussion on social determinants, see generally WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. COMM’N. ON SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, CLOSING THE GAP 
IN A GENERATION: HEALTH EQUITY THROUGH ACTION ON THE SOCIAL 
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH (2008), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/
2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf; Audrey R. Chapman, The Social Determinants of 
Health, Health Equity and Human Rights, 12 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 17 (2010); 
Katarina Tomasevski, Health Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 125, 126 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1995). 
 27. For the discussion on the influence of discrimination on health, see 
Nancy Krieger, Discrimination and Health, in SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 36 (Lisa 
Berkman et al. eds., 2000). For the discussion on the effect of stress caused by 
discrimination on health, see Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice and Discrimination as 
Social Stressors, in THE HEALTH OF SEXUAL MINORITIES: PUBLIC HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER POPULATIONS 242 
(Ilan H. Meyer & Mary Northridge eds., 2007). 
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study of the fulfillment (or lack thereof) of the OPT’s residents 
right to health,28 but of the role that litigation in Israeli courts 
has played in addressing this right and, specifically, the aspects 
of it pertaining to access to health care. 
Part I of this Article outlines the normative framework 
relevant to the discussion. Part II focuses on freedom of 
movement, the issue identified as crucial in the litigation 
affecting access to health care. Part III deals with the protection 
of civilians and medical teams during hostilities. The 
conclusions sum up the various topics discussed, showing how 
Israeli case law on the right to health of Palestinians in the OPT 
is almost entirely lacking in any references to the right to health 
as a human right in international law and turns only rarely to 
the specific obligations under International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL). These lacunae are pointed out in the argumentation 
adopted by the courts especially, but not only, in the Gaza cases: 
Israeli courts often deal with access to health care by 
Palestinians from the OPT as mainly a humanitarian issue (not 
in the sense of binding obligations from IHL but in the sense of 
a humanitarian gesture) rather than as a matter raising 
questions of rights and duties. 
I. THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
A. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
A number of legal sources are relevant to the right to health 
in the OPT. The first is IHL, which is applicable in occupied 
territories.29 While the Geneva Conventions include provisions 
on the protection of the health of combatants who are sick or 
injured,30 the present Article focuses on the protection of the 
 
 28. For some of these issues, see WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REPORT 
OF A FIELD ASSESSMENT OF HEALTH CONDITIONS IN THE OCCUPIED 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY (OPT) (2015), http://www.who.int/hac/crises/
international/wbgs/opt_field_assessment_health_conditions_1april2015.pdf. 
For social and economic determinants of health in the context of the OPT, see 
EFRAT, supra note 16, at 10–18. 
 29. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter The 
Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
 30. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, arts. 12, 15, 19–20, 24, 26,35, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva 
Convention]. 
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right to health of civilians living in an occupied territory. The 
relevant IHL provisions are thus found mostly in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention (GCIV) dealing with the protection of 
civilians, which includes provisions entitling “protected 
persons”31 to “respect for their persons,”32 the requirement of 
“particular protection and respect” for the wounded, sick and 
infirm,33 duties concerning the removal of the wounded, sick, 
and infirm from besieged or encircled areas and the passage of 
medical personnel and equipment to such areas,34 the protection 
of civilian hospitals and their personnel,35 of convoys conveying 
wounded and sick civilians,36 and the free passage of all 
consignments of medical and hospital stores.37 While these 
provisions are relevant to the protection of civilians any time the 
GCIV is triggered (meaning situations of armed conflict and/or 
occupation), some apply specifically in occupation and are thus 
of special relevance, reflecting the broader duties of the 
occupying power controlling the territory. Thus, an occupier has 
the duty of “ensuring the . . . medical supplies of the population,” 
including bringing in “medical stores and other articles if the 
resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.”38 Moreover, 
the occupying power has the duty “of ensuring and maintaining, 
with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the 
medical and hospital establishment and services, public health 
and hygiene in the occupied territory,” to allow for medical 
personnel of all categories to carry on their duties,39 and for 
National Red Cross Societies to pursue their activities.40 If the 
population in the occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the 
occupying power shall agree to relief schemes and shall facilitate 
 
 31. Palestinians living in the OPT are protected persons in the sense 
defined in The Fourth Geneva Convention. The Fourth Geneva Convention, 
supra note 29, art 4. 
 32. Id. art. 27. See Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts arts. 10-11, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. Israel is not a party to Additional Protocol I 
but is bound by the parts of it that are considered as customary international 
law. 
 33. The Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 29, art. 16. 
 34. Id. art. 17. 
 35. Id. arts. 18-20; Additional Protocol I, supra note 32, arts. 12–29. 
 36. The Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 29, arts. 21–22. 
 37. Id. art. 23. 
 38. Id. art. 55. 
 39. Id. art. 56. For related provisions, see id. art. 57. 
 40. Id. art. 63. 
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them, including the provision of medical supplies.41 These 
provisions reflect the overall responsibility of an occupying 
power for access to health care in an occupied territory. 
Several questions arise regarding the application of these 
provisions and the duties they entail in the context discussed in 
this article. The first relates to Israel’s position stating that 
GCIV does not apply to the OPT given that, before 1967, the area 
was not part of a state party to GCIV.42 Israel took this position 
after 1967 while declaring that it would de facto act in 
accordance with the Convention’s humanitarian provisions.43 
This position, however, has been widely rejected, including by 
the International Court of Justice,44 and this article, therefore, 
assumes that GCIV applies to the OPT. The second question 
touches on the scope of Israel’s duties after the Oslo Accords, 
which transferred health from Israel, the occupying power, to 
the PA, giving rise to complex questions about the division of 
duties regarding access to health care in the OPT.45 This article, 
as noted, endorses a functional approach stating that Israel 
bears full responsibility whenever its actions affect the OPT 
residents’ access to health care. Moreover, according to the Oslo 
Agreements, Israel retained its overall responsibilities as 
occupier,46 even if some of the authority was “outsourced” to the 
 
 41. See id. art. 59, 60–61. For a discussion of some of these duties, see 
YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ITS INTERACTION WITH 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 355-74, 399-547 (2009). YORAM DINSTEIN, 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 187-90, 191-94 (2009). 
 42. See Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the 
Administered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262, 263 (1971). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 101 (July 9). 
For a discussion of the arguments dismissing the Israeli positions, see GROSS, 
supra note 4, at 136-264. 
 45. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements (DOP), Isr.-PLO, art. 6, Sept. 13, 1993, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm 
[hereinafter Oslo Accords]; GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 43-44 
(2000). 
 46. See Oslo Accords, supra note 45, art. 6. For a discussion, see WATSON, 
supra note 45, at43–44. Joel Singer, the legal advisor to the Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs during the signing of the Oslo Accords, emphasized that the 
status of the West Bank and Gaza was not to be changed, notwithstanding the 
transfer to the Palestinian Authority (PA) of certain powers and responsibilities 
previously exercised by Israel. See Oslo Accords, supra note 45, art. 4 
(determining that both sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single 
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PA meaning that, should the latter not fulfill the right to health 
where it is acting, Israel could still be held responsible.47 This is 
a significant issue given the many cases pertaining to 
restrictions on exit from the OPT to enter Israel, or to travel from 
Israel to other countries when adequate health care is 
unavailable in the OPT. Israel’s responsibility under IHL (as 
well as under human rights law, as addressed below) derives 
from its overall responsibility as the occupier as well as from its 
specific actions, which control the life and movement of the 
occupied population and thus their access to health care. 
B. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Besides IHL, international human rights law also applies. 
Current international law analysis assumes that human rights 
standards apply extraterritorially, that is, a state is bound by 
these standards not only in its actions within its own territory 
but also beyond it.48 This view is supported by the growing 
 
territorial unit whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period). 
Article 6 of Annex 2 to the same declaration determined that, other than the 
agreed arrangements, the status of Gaza and Jericho (where Palestinian self-
rule was first implemented) would continue to be an integral part of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip and would not be changed in the interim period. Id. 
annex 2, art. 2. Identical declarations appear in Articles XXX.8 and XI.1. of the 
Interim Agreement. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-PLO, Sept. 28, 1995, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20israeli-
palestinian%20interim%20agreement.aspx. See also Agreement on 
Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Isr.-PLO, art. 13(5), Aug. 
29, 1994, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/agreement
%20on%20preparatory%20transfer%20of%20powers%20and%20re.aspx 
(determining that the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area would continue to be an 
integral part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that the status of the 
West Bank would not be changed for the period of the agreement and nothing 
in the agreement would be construed as changing this status); Joel Singer, 
Aspects of Foreign Relations under the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza, 28 ISR. L. 
REV. 268, 274 (1994); Joel Singer, The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements: Some Legal Aspects, 1 JUSTICE MAG. 4, 6 (1994). 
 47. On the need to hold Israel responsible for the Palestinians’ health 
status and access to health care, see FILC, supra note 7, at 152. 
 48. See MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES (2011); GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE 
EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2012); Maastricht 
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (2011), http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-
navigation/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid
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international jurisprudence on the human rights duties of states 
occupying territory beyond their borders or otherwise exercising 
extraterritorial control. Given that the context of the present 
discussion is of an armed conflict and occupation, it also merits 
note that most courts, tribunals, treaty bodies, and scholars 
addressing this matter currently hold that human rights norms 
apply alongside IHL.49 Despite the complex relationship 
between these sets of duties,50 obligations stemming from the 
right to health are clearly applicable in this situation given the 
scope and duration of Israel’s control in both the West Bank and 
Gaza. Questions may certainly arise concerning the duties of a 
belligerent or occupying power that derive from social and 
economic rights such as, whether a belligerent or short-term 
occupier (unlike Israel) can be considered as lacking capabilities 
to develop an extensive healthcare or welfare system in the 
external territory under its control.51 Yet, these issues are not 
 
%5D=23, [hereinafter Maastricht Principles]. 
 49. This position has been taken by the International Court of Justice 
concerning armed conflict in general. E.g. Case Concerning Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
Rep. 168, ¶ 178 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 
¶¶ 102–14 (July 9) (specifically concerning occupation); Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July 
8). The same position has been taken by the European Court of Justice in a few 
of its judgments, notably in Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/ 07, 
53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589 ¶¶ 90–91, 131–38 (2011). This position has also been 
taken by the Israel Supreme Court in some of its cases, such as HCJ 769/02 
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, ¶ 18 (December 
14, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). A similar 
view was expressed by the U.N. Treaty Bodies. See Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval 
Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories, 37 ISR. L. REV. 17 (2004); Aeyal Gross, Human Proportions: Are 
Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes of the International Law of 
Occupation? 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007); Aeyal Gross, The Righting of the Law 
of Occupation, in THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016); 
Noam Lubell, Human Rights in Military Occupations, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
317 (2012); YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 41, at 399–547. The literature 
on this topic is extensive, and these are only a few examples. 
 50. For a discussion of the relationship in the context of the right to health, 
see Sylvain Vite, The Interrelation of the Law of Occupation and Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: The Examples of Food, Health, and Property, 90 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 629 (2008). 
 51. See Lubell, supra note 49, at 322. Lubell points out how, in the context 
of occupation, practical and legal impossibilities may play a part in an occupier’s 
limited ability to implement human rights obligations in the same manner it 
does domestically. He suggests that, although the starting point is the 
presupposition of a need to meet the entire range of obligations, the contextual 
circumstances should be taken into account in determining the obligations that 
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relevant to the duties touching on international human rights 
law discussed in this Article. Generally, differences may be 
expected between a state’s domestic duties in relation to social 
and economic rights and those it bears extraterritorially, which 
can vary with the circumstances. As for the OPT, the scope and 
duration of Israel’s control translate into extensive obligations. 
Concerning a state’s extraterritorial obligations, questions may 
arise as to its positive obligations to fulfill the right, proactively 
engaging in activities that ensure its enjoyment. The length and 
extent of Israel’s control, however, do appear to generate 
obligations to fulfill the right or, at the very least, a negative 
obligation to respect the right. Most of the instances discussed 
below indeed address the latter obligation, as could be expected 
given the existence of the PA and the fact that Israel is no longer 
involved in the provision of health services in the OPT, with the 
exception of East Jerusalem.52 
Particularly important for the discussion of the right to 
health from an international human rights law perspective is 
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights. Article 12 determines that each state 
recognizes “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health,” detailing 
the steps needed to realize this right, including the prevention, 
treatment, and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
 
apply in each individual case. Id. Territorial control, including occupation, does 
trigger the applicability of the full range of human rights obligations a state 
must uphold. The substantive elements of the obligation and the assessment of 
whether a violation has occurred, however, must be determined in light of the 
factual and legal contexts, including issues of logistical ability to act or 
restrictions on the occupying power in the occupation regime. Cf. the discussion 
of the obligation to fulfill the right to food during occupation in Aeyal Gross & 
Tamar Feldman, “We Didn’t Want to Hear the Word ‘Calories”: Rethinking Food 
Security, Food Power, and Food Sovereignty—Lessons from the Gaza Closure, 
33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 379 (2015). 
 52. For a discussion of the typology of obligations, see Maastricht 
Principles, supra note 48, which addresses the “obligation to avoid causing 
harm” (Principle 13), but also the obligation of occupying states or states that 
otherwise exercise effective control over territory outside their territories to 
respect, protect, and fulfill the economic, social, and cultural rights of persons 
within that territory (Principle 18). See generally Comm. on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of State Parties’ 
Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant) on Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. 
E/1991/23 (1991); Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
(Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights) on Its Twenty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) 
[hereinafter General Comment 14]. 
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other diseases and the creation of conditions that would assure 
medical attention and services to all in the event of sickness.53 
General Comment 14 of the U.N. Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, which is the official interpretation 
of Article 12, is a key attempt to infuse concrete substance into 
the right to health. Four major principles that emerge from the 
General Comment are relevant to the subjects discussed in this 
article:54 
(a) Availability: The state must have an adequate amount of 
existing health facilities, products, services, and programs.55 
The precise nature of these features will fluctuate in accordance 
with varying circumstances, including the state’s level of 
development.56 In any event, they include the background 
conditions for health, such as water and sanitation, hospitals, 
clinics, trained medical staff, and essential drugs.57 
(b) Accessibility: All health facilities, products, and services 
must be equally accessible to all, without any discrimination.58 
There are four overlapping aspects to accessibility. (1) A 
prohibition on discrimination, especially against the most 
vulnerable and marginalized sectors of the population.59 
(2) Physical accessibility to all sectors of the population, 
especially vulnerable and marginalized groups such as 
minorities, women, children, the elderly, the disabled, and HIV 
and AIDS carriers and patients.60 (3) Economic accessibility to 
all. The system of payment for health services, as well as for 
services related to background conditions for health, must be 
based on a principle of equity and must guarantee that these 
services, whether privately or publicly provided, are accessible 
to everyone, especially socially underprivileged groups.61 Equity 
mandates that the health expenditure burden borne by poor 
 
 53. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 
12, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95–19, 6 I.L.M. 360, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1967). 
See also The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and Globalization, supra 
note 1. 
 54. See generally The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and 
Globalization, supra note 1. 
 55. See General Comment 14, supra note 52, ¶ 12(a). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See BRIGIT C.A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115–16 (2001) (discussing “availability” in this sense). 
 58. See General Comment 14, supra note 52, ¶ 12(b). 
 59. Id. ¶ 12(b)(i). 
 60. Id. ¶ 12(b)(ii). 
 61. Id. ¶ 12(b)(iii). 
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households not be disproportionate to that borne by wealthier 
households.62 (4) Accessibility to information—the right to 
request, receive, and provide information and ideas on health 
issues, subject to the right to personal medical confidentiality.63 
(c) Acceptability: All health facilities, products, and services 
must abide by medical ethics and be sensitive to and respectful 
of the communities, gender differences, confidentiality, and the 
duty to improve the health status of all those concerned.64 
(d) Quality: All health facilities, products, and services must 
be suitable for their purpose and of a good medical and scientific 
quality.65 To this end, amongst other things, skilled medical 
teams, drugs, and scientifically approved hospital equipment, as 
well as clean and potable water and adequate sanitation are 
necessary.66 
The extent to which Israel, the occupying power, can de facto 
sustain these principles depends on the noted division between 
its own powers and those of the PA. Even adopting the position 
that the occupying power bears full responsibility on this matter 
notwithstanding the role of the PA, many of the litigated cases 
have in fact dealt with accessibility—a central pillar of the right 
to health. Yet, whereas much of domestic litigation on the right 
to health (in Israel and elsewhere), deals with financial 
accessibility, many of the cases relating to the OPT deal with 
physical accessibility when limited because of restrictions on 
freedom of movement within and outside the OPT, as discussed 
in detail in Part III below. When Israel’s actions restrict access 
to health care, it is responsible for violating the right of OPT 
Palestinians. The Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) has 
referred to the international human right to health in cases 
dealing with access to health care in Israel for Israeli residents,67 
but not in the cases dealing with OPT residents discussed in this 
Article. In some cases, the reason is the HCJ’s reliance on more 
specific provisions of IHL, and in others, the HCJ’s general 
tendency to eschew matters of principle altogether in favor of a 
search for pragmatic solutions. The significance of this absence 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. ¶ 12(b)(iv); The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and 
Globalization, supra note 1, at 301. 
 64. See General Comment 14, supra note 52, ¶ 12(c). 
 65. Id. ¶ 12(d). 
 66. Id. See also TOEBES, supra note 57, at 112. 
 67. See, e.g., HCJ 3071/05 Gila Luzon v. Israel ¶ 11 (July 28, 2008), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
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of human rights analysis will become apparent below. 
C. ISRAELI LAW 
Israeli law does not apply in the OPT. In cases involving the 
Israeli army, however, the HCJ has pointed out the army’s 
obligation to act in accordance with the standards of Israeli 
administrative law.68 Yet, this view pertains to general 
principles. The limited recognition of the right to health in 
Israeli constitutional law69 did not affect the litigation relating 
to the Palestinians’ right to health. One critical aspect, discussed 
in the next section, is the exclusion of Palestinians residing in 
the OPT from the Israeli National Health Insurance Law. 
D. EXCLUSION FROM ISRAELI NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
LAW 
The exclusion of Palestinian residents of the OPT (except for 
East Jerusalem) from the Israeli National Health Insurance 
Law (NHIL) is another aspect where the implementation of the 
right to health reflects the structure of the occupation as a whole, 
especially since the NHIL applies in personam to Israeli settlers 
living in the OPT. Personal application of Israeli law to settlers 
works in a myriad of ways.70 Concerning the NHIL, Emergency 
Regulations issued by the Israeli government and regularly 
renewed through legislation71 determine that, for the purpose of 
certain Israeli statutes, including the NHIL, people who live in 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Aeyal Gross, In Search of the Right to Health in Israeli Constitutional 
Law, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 311 (Gideon Sapir, 
Daphne Barak-Erez & Aharon Barak eds., 2013); Aeyal Gross, The Right to 
Health in Israel Between Solidarity and Neoliberalism, in THE RIGHT TO 
HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 159, 
163 (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014). 
 70. See GROSS, supra note 4, at 136–264. See also ACRI, ONE RULE—TWO 
LEGAL SYSTEMS: ISRAEL’S REGIME OF LAWS IN THE WEST BANK (2014), 
http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Two-Systems-of-Law-
English-FINAL.pdf; EYAL BENVENISTI, LEGAL DUALISM: THE ABSORPTION OF 
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INTO ISRAEL 3-32 (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press 
1990); BENVENISTI, supra note 5, at 233-38. 
 71. Law for the Extension of Emergency Regulations (Judea, Samaria and 
the Gaza Strip—Judging for Offences and Legal Aid), 5727-1967, SH No. 517 p. 
20 (Isr.); Law for the Extension of Emergency Regulations (Judea and 
Samaria—Judging for Offences and Legal Aid), 5772-2012, SH No. 2365 p. 476 
(Isr.). 
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the OPT will be considered residents of Israel if they are Israeli 
citizens or are “entitled to immigrate to Israel under the Law of 
Return” (that is, Jews and family members of Jews).72 This 
provision is critical because the NHIL regularly applies only to 
residents of Israel, and the OPT (except for East Jerusalem) is, 
legally, not part of Israel. The net result is a different set of 
rights and duties applying to different groups in the OPT along 
ethnic lines, including access to health care. The story of health 
care is thus one of the building blocks in the continued Israeli 
control of the OPT, which is typified by a de facto annexation 
that includes settling citizens of Israel in the OPT (contra 
GCIV)73 without annexing the territory and without granting its 
Palestinian residents the same rights enjoyed by the Israeli 
Jewish settlers.74 Another aspect of health care reflecting the 
main features of this occupation is freedom of movement. 
Restrictions on this freedom are one of this occupation’s most 
salient features, and a great deal of the litigation on the right to 
health in the OPT touches on it. Freedom of movement is thus 
the topic of the next section. 
II. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
A brief account of freedom of movement in the OPT is 
required here to clarify the background of the restrictions 
imposed on it and their effect on health care that can, in a way, 
sum up the story of the occupation. Ariel Handel, a researcher 
at Tel Aviv University, argues that the spatial conflict in 
Israel/Palestine is not over land units but over the very 
possibility of using the space.75 His suggestion is that any map 
 
 72. Article 1 of the 1950 Law of Return gives Jews the right to immigrate 
to Israel. Article 4B defines as a Jew a person who was born to a Jewish mother 
or who has converted to Judaism and is not a member of another religion. The 
right is also granted to children, grandchildren, and spouses of Jews, and to 
spouses of children and grandchildren of Jews, unless they were born Jews and 
willingly converted to another religion (Article 4A). Law of Return, 5710-1950, 
4 LSI 114 (1950). 
 73. The Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 29, art. 49(6). 
 74. GROSS, supra note 4, at 136–264. 
 75. Ariel Handel, Where, Where To, and When in the Occupied Territories: 
An Introduction to Geography of Disaster, in THE POWER OF INCLUSIVE 
EXCLUSION; ANATOMY OF ISRAELI RULE IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN 
TERRITORIES 179, 181 (Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni & Sari Hanafi eds., 2009). 
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of the spatial state of affairs in the OPT represents only the 
principle of temporariness and contingency, pointing to 
indeterminacy concerning how to travel and how long it will 
take.76 This dimension of the occupation can obviously affect 
physical access to health care and the litigation on these matters 
has accordingly changed over the years. 
In 1967, the Israeli Cabinet approved the plan of the then 
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan for an “invisible 
administration,” meaning “open bridges” between the West 
Bank and Jordan as well as free movement between the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip and between the OPT and Israel.77 A 
general exit permit was accordingly issued in 1972, allowing 
OPT residents to enter Israel without individual permits.78 The 
first restrictions on this permit were imposed in 1989, two years 
after the outbreak of the First Intifada.79 Palestinians from Gaza 
working in Israel were required to carry a magnetic card that 
contained updated information on their “security history” and on 
the payment of taxes and utilities, which was to be renewed 
annually.80 On the eve of the 1991 Gulf War, however, as part of 
Israel’s “security measures,” the general exit permit was 
canceled and each resident of the OPT wanting to enter Israel 
was required to obtain an individual permit,81 though the 
prohibition of Palestinians entering Israel was fully enforced 
only from March 1993.82 In 1995, the Brodet Committee 
recommended that the Palestinians’ entry into Israel be made 
conditional on security checks and on increased law enforcement 
measures against those entering without a permit and against 
their employers.83 In the same year, the magnetic card policy 
 
 76. On the bureaucratic regime regarding movement, see YAEL BERDA, THE 
BUREAUCRACY OF THE OCCUPATION: THE PERMITS REGIME IN THE WEST BANK 
2000–2006 (2012). See also YAEL BERDA, LIVIING EMERGENCY: ISRAEL’S PERMIT 
REGIME IN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK (Stanford University Press 2017); 
Gordon & Filc, supra note 6, at 469–72. 
 77. Ariel Handel, Chronology of the Occupation Regime 1967–2007, in THE 
POWER OF INCLUSIVE EXCLUSION; ANATOMY OF ISRAELI RULE IN THE OCCUPIED 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 603, 605 (Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni & Sari Hanafi 
eds., 2009). 
 78. Although the permit was not in force 1:00–5:00 AM, many Palestinians 
workers remained in Israel through the night. Id. at 608. 
 79. GROSS, supra note 4, at 256. 
 80. See Handel, supra note 77, at 617. 
 81. That was also the first time that Israel declared a full closure of the 
OPT for forty-one days. Id. at 618. 
 82. Id. at 619. 
 83. GROSS, supra note 4, at 256–57. 
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was extended to Palestinians from the West Bank as well.84 In 
1996, following a wave of terrorist attacks, comprehensive 
closure as well as an internal closure were imposed on the OPT.85 
After 1993, following the Oslo Accords that divided the OPT into 
various areas according to the degree of Israeli or PA control and 
declared the settlements out of bounds for Palestinians, further 
restrictions on freedom of movement for Palestinians were 
imposed within the OPT.86 To provide for the settlers’ security 
and, in fact, for their “right” to travel without having to go 
through Palestinian-controlled areas, “bypass roads” were built 
for the sole use of settlers.87 In 2000, at the beginning of the 
Second Intifada, Israel banned Palestinians from entering Israel 
and closed the “safe passage” between the West Bank and Gaza, 
the Rafah Crossing, and the international airport in Gaza.88 In 
2001, Israel imposed serious restrictions on travel within the 
West Bank, including “encirclements” of all Palestinian cities 
preventing entry and exit of private vehicles and followed by 
barriers stopping vehicles from crossing into Israel from the 
West Bank.89 In 2002, Israel began to issue internal travel 
permits within the West Bank to allow entry through the 
encirclements it had imposed.90 This period was typified by the 
dissection of the OPT into many and frequently changing “land 
cells,” with many checkpoints within the West Bank and with 
passage between areas becoming slow, unpredictable, and 
nearly impossible.91 Palestinians wasted much time in their 
travels without knowing whether and when they would arrive at 
their destination.92 These restrictions undermine the 
Palestinians’ ability to work, produce, sell, and keep in touch,93 
 
 84. Handel, supra note 77, at 620. 
 85. Id. at 621. 
 86. See Oslo Accords, supra note 45.  
 87. See Samira Shah, On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network 
in the West Bank, The Bypass Road Network in the West Bank, 29 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 221 (1997). See also AHRON BREGMAN, CURSED VICTORY: A 
HISTORY OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 183–84 (2014); ELISHA 
EFRAT, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP: A GEOGRAPHY OF OCCUPATION AND 
DISENGAGEMENT 80-86 (2006). 
 88. Handel, supra note 77, at 624. 
 89. Id. at 625. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Handel, supra note 75, at 182–84. See also Sari Hanafi, Spacio-cide: 
Colonial Politics, Invisibility and Rezoning in Palestinian Territory, 
2 CONTEMP. ARAB AFF. 106 (2009); BENVENISTI, supra note 5, at 238–39. 
 92. Handel, supra note 75, at 191. 
 93. Id. at 193. 
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as well as their access to health care. 
Restrictions also hinder the entry of ambulances and make 
access to more sophisticated health care facilities extremely 
difficult. Chronically ill patients and pregnant women have been 
particularly affected, including several reported cases of women 
losing their babies because of delays at checkpoints during 
labor.94 
The building of the wall in the West Bank beginning in 
200395 led to further restrictions on freedom of movement.96 This 
period was also characterized by the growing separation of the 
West Bank from Gaza, especially after the 2005 
“disengagement,” when Israel pulled out settlers and a 
permanent military presence from Gaza.97 After the 
disengagement, Israel continued to control not only the 
movement of people from Gaza into Israel but also attempted to 
control movement between Gaza and Egypt via the Rafah 
crossing—the only operational border crossing between Egypt 
and Gaza.98 The agreement, Agreement on Movement and 
Access (AMA): Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing,99 brokered 
by the United States after the “disengagement” stated that the 
PA was to operate the Rafah Crossing under the supervision of 
EU monitors who would be present at the Crossing, and of 
Israeli security officials who would oversee the operation via 
video footage and supervision of the passengers list.100 The 
 
 94. FILC, supra note 7, at 144–45. 
 95. Handel, supra note 75, at 626. 
 96. FILC, supra note 7, at 148–49. 
 97. SARI BASHI & EITAN DIAMOND, SEPARATING LAND, SEPARATING 
PEOPLE: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ACCESS RESTRICTIONS BETWEEN GAZA AND THE 
WEST BANK 5 (2015). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Agreed Documents on Movement and Access from and to Gaza, Agreed 
Principles for Rafah Crossing (APRC), Isr.-PA, Nov. 15, 2005, 
http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/files/Agreed%20Principles%20for%20Rafah%20
Crossing.pdf. 
 100. Id. Travel via Rafah would be restricted, with few exceptions, to 
Palestinians registered in the Israeli-controlled Palestinian Population 
Registry, with Israel reserving the right to block entry of Palestinian ID holders 
it considered “terror activists.” Even in the “exceptional” categories—diplomats, 
foreign visitors, foreign representatives of recognized international 
organizations, and humanitarian cases—a foreigner’s ability to cross would be 
subject to veto by Israel, which would have forty-eight hours to register its 
objection. See SARI BASHI & KENNETH MANN, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS: THE 
LEGAL STATUS OF GAZA 32-33 (2007). The author of this Article is a member of 
the board of Gisha, was consulted on this report, and is acknowledged in it. The 
positions expressed here, however, are only the author’s. 
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Rafah Crossing was to be monitored by Israeli security officials 
via cameras receiving video and data feed on its operation in real 
time.101 Under these arrangements, then, foreigners could enter 
Gaza only via the Israeli-controlled crossing at Erez, and the 
Gazans’ possibilities of receiving family members, visiting 
lecturers, professionals, businesspersons, and medical care 
workers were all restricted and dependent on obtaining an entry 
visa to Israel, as illustrated in some of the cases discussed 
below.102 
Under AMA, Israel also controlled all imports into Gaza. 
Except for personal effects brought in by travelers, imports were 
not permitted via air, sea, or the Rafah Crossing, and only goods 
passing through and inspected in Israel could be brought in.103 
The import of any goods into Gaza thus remained dependent on 
Israel opening the crossings and on its regulations as to what 
would be allowed through it, a closure entailing huge effects for 
all aspects of life.104 
The opening and closing of the crossings have fluctuated 
over time. Regarding the Rafah Crossing, after Palestinians 
attacked an Israeli military outpost at Kerem Shalom in June 
2006 and captured Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier, Israel stopped 
implementing the AMA and kept the Crossing mostly closed.105 
After June 2007, when Hamas took control of the government in 
the Gaza Strip, Israel froze implementation of the AMA.106 Ever 
since, and given other changes instituted by the new Egyptian 
government, the Crossing has remained mostly closed.107 
Gazans have resorted to alternatives, such as breaches of the 
border by Hamas,108 ad hoc Egypt-Hamas arrangements that led 
 
 101. BASHI & MANN, supra note 100, at 33–36. An Israeli objection to the 
entrance of a foreigner in one of the exceptional categories triggered a process 
of consultations between Israeli, Palestinians, and EU representatives with 
Israel making the final decision, even though the wording of the agreement 
suggested that Israel’s role is advisory. Israeli consent was required for the 
Rafah crossing to be open and Israel could close it, as it did at times, based on 
what it considered security considerations. The European monitors would not 
staff their positions in Rafah if Israel said it would not open the crossing because 
of security reasons. See also NOGA KADMAN, RAFA CROSSING: WHO HOLDS THE 
KEYS? 21–28 (2009). 
 102. BASHI & MANN, supra note 100, at 35. 
 103. Id. at 41; KADMAN, supra note 101, at 27. 
 104. KADMAN, supra note 101, at 65–117. 
 105. Id. at 27. 
 106. Id. at 29. 
 107. Id. at 35–38. 
 108. Id. at 44–47. 
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to unpredictable and irregular openings for brief periods in 
response to pressures from both sides of the border,109 and the 
use of tunnels dug under the Gaza-Egypt border.110 
The fluid situation in Gaza is also related to political 
developments within the PA. Hamas gained a majority in the 
2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, ending the 
Fatah dominance that had prevailed since the PA’s 
establishment.111 In March 2007, a Hamas-led national unity 
government was formed together with Fatah, the largest group 
in the Palestine Liberation Organization.112 This alliance broke 
down and, in June 2007, following its success in an armed 
struggle with Fatah, Hamas assumed overall control of Gaza.113 
As a result, PA President Abbas, a Fatah member, dismissed the 
Hamas-led government and, ever since, the West Bank has been 
under Fatah control and Gaza under Hamas.114 In the wake of 
these developments, Israel imposed a closure on Gaza in 2007.115 
Restrictions on the movement of people and goods in Gaza, 
however, developed in several stages even before 2007. As 
described, following the removal of the settlements and of the 
military presence in 2005, Israel sustained its control of access 
to and from Gaza via sea and air and, to a smaller extent, 
through the Gaza-Egypt border.116 Nevertheless, Israel 
proceeded to relate to Gaza as a foreign territory to which it owes 
no responsibilities other than those mandated by the laws of 
armed conflict.117 In 2006–2010, for example, the Rafah Crossing 
with Egypt was closed almost entirely.118 As a result, approval 
to cross the Gaza-Israel border was required in order to leave 
Gaza to any destination.119 After it was opened in 2010 to 
restricted traffic, an Israeli-approved identification card was 
 
 109. Id. at 47–52. 
 110. Id. at 52–55. 
 111. BASHI & MANN, supra note 100, at 8–11. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Iain Scobbie, Gaza, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 280 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012). 
 115. BASHI & MANN, supra note 100, at 8–11. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Sari Bashi, Controlling Perimeters, Controlling Lives: Israel and Gaza, 
7 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS, 243, 246-47 (2013) (shows how control over access is a 
new form of bureaucratic control, typical of colonial and military regimes). 
 118. Id. at 252. 
 119. Id. at 252–53. 
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still needed for passing.120 Passage to the West Bank, however, 
remained under Israeli control which meant Palestinians who 
were Gaza residents were not allowed to enter the West Bank 
through the Israel-Jordan crossing even if they had made the 
long detour from Gaza via Egypt and Jordan.121 As for goods, 
prior to 2007, the restrictions had been implemented mostly by 
closing the commercial crossings or restricting their opening 
hours.122 In 2007, the government initiated a policy of 
deliberately restricting the movement of goods solely to those 
necessary for basic human needs.123 Given the additional naval 
and aerial blockade imposed by Israel,124 restrictions on freedom 
of movement to and from Gaza imposed by Israel are extensive. 
The next section deals with the effect of freedom of movement 
restrictions on health care. 
B. CASES INVOLVING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ACCESS 
TO HEALTH CARE 
The review of issues relating to freedom of movement in the 
OPT describing different stages and options of restrictions 
highlights the centrality of this issue to the Israeli occupation 
and, specifically, to physical access to health care.125 The 
discussion in this section considers case law related to this topic. 
The cases were divided into three categories that reflect 
varieties of restrictions on freedom of movement: (1) issues 
involving checkpoints and other restrictions within the OPT, 
especially within the West Bank, (2) issues involving restrictions 
caused by the wall, (3) issues involving exit permits (to Israel or 
elsewhere) from the OPT. The third category is further divided 
into three categories: cases involving exit of patients from the 
West Bank and from Gaza before the disengagement, cases 
involving exit of patients from Gaza after the disengagement, 
and cases relating to the exit of medical staff and medical 
students.126 
 
 120. Id. at 253. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 259. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See generally Gross & Feldman, supra note 51 (discussing the 
restriction of the movement of goods in connection to food security). 
 125. See Angelo Stefanini & Hadas Ziv, Occupied Palestinian Territory: 
Linking Health to Human Rights, 8 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 160 (2004). See also 
ZIV, supra note 6, at 38–56. 
 126. A case pre-dating the ones discussed below dealt with the provision of 
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1. Checkpoints, Blockings, and “Encirclements” 
Cases dealing with restrictions on freedom of movement 
through the use of checkpoints in ways that affect access to 
health care were especially prevalent at the height of the Second 
Intifada, which erupted in 2000.127 A number of such cases 
reached the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court of 
Justice (HCJ). Usually, the HCJ refrained from intervening, at 
times seeing the petitions as too general and at times accepting 
the army’s promises to ease the restrictions when access to 
health care was involved.128 
A few cases will serve as illustration. Even before most of 
these cases were litigated, however, an earlier case dealing with 
issues involving exit permits raised the question about 
procedures regarding checkpoints. The petitioner in this case, as 
in many others discussed in this Article, was the Israeli 
non-governmental organization Physicians for Human Rights – 
Israel (PHRI).129 When it first brought up the issue of the 
checkpoints’ effect on access to health care, the state answered 
that, following the petition, a new instruction/procedure had 
been distributed.130 This new directive, dealing with West Bank 
residents reaching a checkpoint during a medical emergency, 
 
medical services during a curfew imposed in the OPT during the 1991 Gulf War. 
The matter was obsolete by the time the judgment was given, but the HCJ 
addressed some of the issues that emerged and determined that the movement 
of doctors and patients during curfew should be specified in instructions to be 
issued by the army in both Hebrew and Arabic, which should include full details 
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was supposed to solve the matter. Yet, three years later, after 
delays in checkpoints led pregnant women on the way to delivery 
to lose their babies,131 the case reached the HCJ again. The 
petition argued that the army had not implemented the 
procedure agreed upon in the previous case.132 The petitioners 
demanded that the procedure be internalized and that officers 
who had not briefed soldiers about it as well as officers and 
soldiers failing to comply with it be investigated and tried.133 In 
its reply, the army admitted there had been a flaw and the 
procedure presented to the HCJ had not been disseminated, 
noting that an internal army investigation had concluded that 
the reason for it could have been staff changes.134 An order was 
issued to inform all soldiers of the procedure and to distribute it 
at the checkpoints.135 
With the eruption of the Second Intifada and the increasing 
restrictions on movement within the West Bank, the problems 
worsened and assumed new forms, especially concerning 
unstaffed blockings that were challenged in various litigation 
attempts. In March 2001, the HCJ rejected a petition of PHRI 
after the army had placed checkpoints in the West Bank and 
Gaza due to, as described by the HCJ, the “difficult security 
situation occurring in these territories, as part of the army’s 
attempts to prevent terrorist attacks.”136 The petitioners argued 
that checkpoints that created closure or “encirclement” prevent 
the provision of food, medicine, and health services to the 
population.137 They also argued that, despite the army’s 
commitment to enable emergency passage for medical purposes, 
this procedure was not implemented and many emergency cases 
had been forced to wait for a long time at checkpoints.138 Often, 
they had not been allowed to pass at all and had been forced to 
seek alternative routes.139 The HCJ refused to engage with this 
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petition, holding that the petitioner had drawn a general picture 
without any factual basis.140 It cited the army’s argument that, 
under its own policies, each area must have at least one route 
where soldiers are present.141 It further argued that, according 
to military procedures that the soldiers were made aware of, 
passage at these checkpoints should be allowed in all cases of 
medical necessity.142 The army admitted there is no guarantee 
that all soldiers at all checkpoints in all cases do comply with 
these procedures.143 Violations of this procedure, however, if 
any, should be reported, and the army will then take the 
necessary measures.144 On these grounds, the HCJ rejected the 
petition arguing that the proper way to deal with this matter is 
to launch individual complaints when procedures are not carried 
out.145 With this procedure, the HCJ will then be able to address 
specific petitions about specific cases if a complaint has not been 
properly examined. The HCJ further noted that it would be 
improper for it to order the army to fulfill its own procedures, 
and also rejected the request to order the army to determine and 
publish procedures allowing for the regular supply of food and 
medicine and the free movement of medical teams in the OPT, 
based on the army’s claim that it was its policy to allow for such 
provision and movement.146 
This judgment, from the beginning of the Second Intifada, 
highlights the non-intervention route chosen by the HCJ when 
dealing with attempts at impact litigation seeking to challenge 
policies restricting freedom of movement and, accordingly, 
access to health care. The HCJ chose to see such arguments 
generally, point to army procedures, and suggest individual 
complaints. It thus dismissed the possibility of a broader 
examination of the policy and the procedures by rejecting the 
demand for a specific positive order on freedom of movement 
regarding access to health care, a pattern that we will see 
recurring. The problems persisted, however, and more cases date 
back to that period. Some of them, dealing with specific villages 
rather than with a generalized petition, point to a pattern: while 
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the case is pending, the army announces it will open up a route. 
The petition is then rejected given factual changes that occur 
during the litigation, and the HCJ again refuses to engage in a 
broader review of the effects of movement restrictions. One such 
case dealt with a specific village blocked by stone and earth 
obstacles set up by the army.147 The village did not have a clinic, 
forcing the residents to walk or ride a donkey for a few 
kilometers in order to reach one.148 The petitioners demanded 
that an access road be opened to their village and also, more 
generally, that the army refrain from setting up physical (rather 
than staffed) barriers in other cases as well.149 Addressing the 
case, the HCJ noted that the state’s response mentioned that the 
barrier set up on one route to the village had been removed and 
the Court was satisfied that this had fulfilled part of the 
petitioner’s demands.150 As for the broader demand to remove 
barriers on roads in the area more generally and refrain from 
setting up physical blocks, the HCJ again found this to be a 
“general and unspecified” petition lacking a concrete basis that 
would allow the court to examine it.151 Additionally, the Court 
said it had taken note of the state’s declaration that, if 
emergency passage was needed, the residents could approach 
the army’s local coordination office and even the State 
Attorney.152 As in its previous judgment, the HCJ did not 
address the right to health under IHL or human rights law. In a 
very brief decision, it showed satisfaction with the solution of the 
concrete case (a solution reached under the shadow of the 
litigation) but refused to leverage the case for a broader 
statement. Given the extent of such restrictions at the time, the 
HCJ’s refusal to look at the forest rather than at specific trees 
precluded addressing the wider problem. The notion of calling 
up the army or representatives of the State Attorney’s office in 
emergency cases is hardly a solution precisely because 
emergencies, by definition, do not leave time for such calls. 
The pattern where a petition can lead to a local remedy or 
solution was apparent in other cases as well. Those cases 
stresses the effect of the restrictions on freedom of movement on 
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health care by pointing not only to the limits they place on 
patients but also on the medical staff, equipment, and 
ambulances. In the hearings of one of those cases, the state 
announced it would keep an access road to the village open and 
the petitioners agreed to withdraw their petition.153 
The Sisyphean attempts to ease these restrictions continued 
in another case, dealing with barriers set up by the Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) around three villages near the city of 
Nablus, which prevented access to the city.154 The army 
informed the Court it had opened an alternative route 
connecting the villages to a checkpoint to their south and from 
that checkpoint to Nablus.155 This road, though unpaved, was 
open to all vehicles.156 The army also noted two procedures it had 
instituted instructing soldiers in checkpoints on the treatment 
of residents seeking medical care and of residents reaching a 
checkpoint during medical emergencies.157 The HCJ found these 
answers satisfactory, citing security concerns, the fact that the 
state had pointed to Nablus as a hotbed of terrorist activity, and 
noting that the army’s measures were all intended to protect 
Israelis against terrorism.158 It did concede that the villagers, 
though mostly innocent, suffered from a difficult situation, but 
could not find that the army’s actions failed tests of 
reasonableness or proportionality.159 
Addressing the argument that soldiers at checkpoints do not 
comply with the orders on the passage of Palestinians seeking 
medical care, the HCJ claimed this was a general argument it 
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could not address, again avoiding any comprehensive judicial 
pronouncement.160 Instead, the Court recommended that the 
army should continually remind soldiers at checkpoints of the 
need to act humanely.161 
All the cases cited were litigated from 2001–2003. In none 
of them did the HCJ offer an analysis of the right to health, 
addressing the relevant provisions on it in IHL or in human 
rights law. Given the scope of the problems resulting from the 
restrictions on freedom of movement caused by the encirclement 
and blocking of villages, the HCJ’s refusal to consider this 
predicament from a broader perspective, either factually or 
legally, hindered its role in this issue even if, arguably, the fate 
of some villages was alleviated. 
The issue of checkpoints was attacked through the judicial 
system not only through administrative petitions to the HCJ, 
but also in a tort claim brought by a West Bank resident who 
was delayed at an army checkpoint.162 The claimant, who was 
the mother of a nine-day-old boy, was with him en route to a 
hospital in Nablus when they were delayed at a checkpoint.163 
The baby died on arrival to the hospital.164 The Court noted the 
claimant had stated that, although she believed the baby had 
died because of the delay at the checkpoint, after consulting an 
expert she had conceded that no causality link could be shown 
between the delay and the death.165 Nevertheless, the Court held 
for the claimant after it found that her claims of delay, brutal 
behavior by the soldiers, and violence were credible.166 The 
Court also awarded her damages, holding she had suffered 
indirect damages because of her exposure to the suffering and 
death of her son, and direct damages as she was exposed to 
violence.167 This case points to the potential of tort litigation to 
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tackle restrictions on freedom of movement. Though the scope 
was limited in this case because of the lack of proved causality, 
it does suggest a channel that can potentially be used in other 
cases as well. The tort tool, however, is always ex-post and 
cannot ease restrictions in real time or undo medical harm or 
death. 
The barriers, encirclement, and checkpoints within the 
West Bank that had been widespread during the Second Intifada 
are far fewer now, so litigation about them has also declined. 
With the recent resurgence of violence in the West Bank, 
however, some cases have been reported of a siege on Palestinian 
villages that affected access to health care, including delays and 
disturbances to the circulation of ambulances.168 
Restrictions on freedom of movement within the West Bank, 
though reduced, have not disappeared entirely, and cases 
relating to them still arise. In 2016, the HCJ dealt with a closure 
imposed by the Israeli army on the city of Yatta, in the Hebron 
District.169 This closure was part of various severe restrictions 
affecting the city’s residents after two of them carried out a 
terrorist attack in Tel Aviv. The petitioners argued that the 
measures restricted access to two hospitals, two medical centers, 
clinics, pharmacies, and laboratories that serve some 70,000 
residents of the city and about 30,000 living in its vicinity.170 Not 
only do these procedures prevent access to medical facilities in 
the city but they also hinder the transfer of patients from local 
to outside centers.171 The petitioners noted the violations of 
prohibitions on collective punishment and various other rights, 
including the right to freedom of movement, claiming that the 
closure entails a severe breach of the rights to health and quick 
access to health services, which are anchored in international 
human rights law.172 As often in the past, however, only four 
days after the filing of the petition, the army began removing the 
barriers and the petitioners requested that the HCJ cancel the 
urgent hearing scheduled for two days later, asking to submit a 
revised notice.173 After the last barrier at the entrance to the city 
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was removed, both sides agreed to withdraw the petition.174 
As the latter case illustrates, issues similar to those 
described in this section may come up in the courts again. The 
current military order on this matter determines that 
Palestinian residents arriving at a checkpoint (including one 
leading to Israel) for emergency medical treatment will be 
allowed to cross even when lacking the permit that is usually 
required. The commander of the checkpoint, to whom a soldier 
must report such a case, has discretion on the matter.175 As in 
the past, questions about implementation may resurface, but the 
easing of restrictions on movement within the West Bank and 
the removal of many internal checkpoints have led, as noted, to 
less litigation on this issue reaching the Court in recent years. 
Rather than disappearing, however, restrictions on freedom of 
movement within the West Bank and their effect on health care 
have mostly been translated into another form, to which I turn 
next. 
2. The Wall 
In the early 2000s, Israel began building a wall in the West 
Bank, which it describes as a “security fence.”176 Around this 
time, cases involving the wall became the focus of the HCJ case 
law dealing with the OPT in general, and with freedom of 
movement and its effect on access to health care in particular. 
The HCJ has addressed restrictions on access to health care as 
part of the problems created by the wall in two related forms.177 
The first involves the route of the wall, which separated people 
from their health services, and the second concerns the effects of 
the permits regime dealing with access to health care instituted 
in the “seam zone.”178 The “seam zone” is the area between the 
 
scheduled for July 27, 2016. See id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), 
Treatment of Judea and Samaria Area Resident Reaching Checkpoint in 
Emergency Medical Situation (Oct. 2014). 
 176. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 79 (July 9). See 
also Aeyal Gross, The Construction of a Wall between the Hague and Jerusalem: 
The Enforcement and Limits of Humanitarian Law and the Structure of 
Occupation, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 393, 394 n.4 (2006). 
 177. See generally Gross, supra note 176, at 402–422 (discussing the two 
Israeli High Court of Justice cases on the matter).  
 178. Id. at 389 n. 22, 412. 
450 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2 
wall and the Green Line; Palestinians residing in it became 
subject to the permits’ regime with the wall’s construction.179 
The construction of the wall as such has been addressed not 
only by the Israeli HCJ but also by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). The ICJ examined Israel’s actions and their effect 
on the lives of Palestinians in the OPT in light of certain 
provisions of GCIV, the Hague Regulations of 1907, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.180 The 
violation of these provisions purportedly infringes the freedom 
of movement as well as the rights to work, health, education, and 
an adequate standard of living, besides provisions concerning 
the protection of property.181 Information that Palestinians 
living between the wall and the Green Line would be cut off from 
their land, workplaces, schools, health clinics, and other social 
services, was pertinent to the ICJ’s determination on this 
matter.182 The holding that Israel’s actions violated not only IHL 
but also human rights treaties rested on the ICJ’s holding that 
international human rights law applies in occupied territories 
alongside IHL.183 
Based on these violations, as well as on its determinations 
that the wall is illegal since its route “gives expression in loco to 
the illegal measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem 
and the settlements,”184 and that its construction, together with 
previous measures, “severely impedes the exercise by the 
Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and is 
therefore a breach of Israel’s obligation to respect this right,”185 
the ICJ found that the building of the wall in the OPT is 
illegal.186 By contrast, the Israeli HCJ has refrained from such a 
statement, holding instead that the Israeli army was within its 
authority when building the wall in the OPT given its power to 
act for security purposes.187 The debate on cases on the wall in 
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the Israeli HCJ, then, has focused mostly on whether 
restrictions of Palestinian rights in specific segments or 
particular measures adopted in the context of building the wall 
have been proportional. 
This Article will address only some of the many HCJ cases 
concerning the wall, where access to health care arguments 
played a central role.188 Generally, five stages can be identified 
in the HCJ’s case law on the matter. (1) Before the General 
Assembly requested the ICJ to issue the Advisory Opinion, the 
HCJ had issued brief judgments holding it would not interfere 
in the matter based on the principle of deferring to security 
considerations.189 (2) Beit-Sourik, issued in 2005 several days 
before the Advisory Opinion, was the HCJ’s first major judgment 
on the topic.190 The HCJ held that building the wall in the OPT 
was legal but that the segment examined in the decision was 
illegal on grounds of proportionality.191 (3) Mara’abe, issued in 
2006 after the Advisory Opinion and repeating the logic of Beit 
Sourik, also held that protecting the settlements amounted to a 
legitimate security consideration that could justify building the 
wall.192 (4) Post-Mara’abe decisions where, except for cases 
where the wall had clearly been built to protect settlement 
expansion, the HCJ approved various segments (unlike in its 
landmark decisions in Beit Sourik and Mara’abe), arguing that 
the restrictions of movement were less severe than in those two 
cases.193 Notably, in some of the cases discussed after Mara’abe, 
the route of the wall was changed as part of an out-of-court 
settlement between the parties.194 (5) The complex regime of 
permits in force in the “seam zone,” which is used to regulate the 
lives of Palestinians, was upheld by the HCJ as an integral part 
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of the wall, arguing that its effects would be more adequately 
dealt in localized petitions.195 
To illustrate this trajectory, several cases specifically 
concerned with access to health care will be cited in more detail. 
In Mara’abe, one of the two “landmark cases,”196 the HCJ held 
that the route of the wall in the area discussed had created a 
“chokehold” over a number of Palestinian villages.197 Among the 
wall’s detrimental effects on their lives, the petitioners 
mentioned that they depended on health services from which the 
wall had now separated them.198 The wall did have gates, but 
they opened only at certain hours, making the villagers’ trip to 
the nearby governmental hospital much longer.199 The HCJ cited 
in its judgment an expert opinion that, inter alia, noted that the 
wall had detached the villages in the area from health services, 
that the medical care provided in the villages was now partial 
and irregular, and that the access of emergency vehicles had 
been badly affected.200 The petitioners argued that, in these 
circumstances, the right to health had been disproportionately 
violated.201 The HCJ accepted this argument, pointing out that 
no hospitals or clinics existed in the villages affected by the wall 
in that area and that the movement of doctors and ambulances 
to the villages had been seriously disrupted, without any 
solutions offered for emergencies.202 
But Ma’arabe, as noted, was the exception to the rule. In 
most subsequent cases, the HCJ refused to intervene, even if the 
wall was occasionally rerouted during the litigation. In 2006, for 
example, the HCJ rejected a petition concerning a wall segment 
built near two Palestinian villages.203 The petitioner, a resident 
from one of the villages, claimed that, because of delays, her twin 
girls had been born at the checkpoint in her village and had 
died.204 The army agreed to reroute the wall while the litigation 
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was pending but the petitioners argued that the new course still 
detached the village from some of its lands.205 The HCJ, 
however, refused to intervene and ruled that the new route was 
within the army’s “zone of proportionality.”206 The litigation, 
however, was still somewhat helpful to the petitioners, whom 
the Court cited as agreeing that the wall’s negative effect on 
their “web of life” had been significantly narrowed after the 
rerouting.207 
In other cases, petitions were rejected even without 
adopting any changes. For example, a 2006 petition concerning 
the wall’s route in another area of the West Bank claimed that 
it prevented access from the villages to neighboring cities and 
violated many of the residents’ rights, including the right to 
health.208 The HCJ again declined to intervene and found that 
the building of the wall in that area, beside the army’s 
commitment to ensure the Palestinian residents’ access to the 
main cities, was justified and met proportionality tests.209 
Similar rulings were issued in other cases.210 The HCJ thus 
intervened in a few exceptional instances, while agreements on 
changes were reached in its shadow in a few others.211 Generally, 
however, the HCJ upheld the building of the wall, thus 
legitimizing the attending restrictions on freedom of 
movement.212 Its discussion of the wall, then, was fragmented 
into various petitions, each considering a specific segment, 
unlike that of the ICJ, which had looked at the wall as a whole.213 
By the time the HCJ came to deal with a petition submitted 
against the wall in general, the arguments raised in it had 
become irrelevant.214 The HCJ’s examination of each case 
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separately did enable it to distinguish between more and less 
severe cases but, without addressing the problem as a whole, the 
issue became mostly one of proportionality.215 In this model of 
analysis, freedom of movement generally, and for health needs 
specifically, can be denied so long as it is “proportional” to 
security needs. This model, however, fails to take into account 
the bigger picture not only of the wall but also of the occupation 
in general—security is allocated to one side only and, in its 
name, rights are denied. The problem is not the wall per se but 
a regime that allows restrictions on the civilians’ right to 
freedom of movement, including for health purposes, which a 
proportionality analysis can perhaps help to alleviate but cannot 
resolve. The HCJ, which did not agree to look at the bigger 
picture of the wall, certainly avoided looking at the even bigger 
picture of the occupation regime as a whole.216 
A rather exceptional instance of intervention is a case 
involving a measure similar to the wall but not quite the wall. 
The HCJ accepted a petition of Palestinian residents opposing 
the building of a concrete railing alongside a road meant to 
protect settlers who use it.217 The HCJ noted that the railing 
would affect about five thousand residents from nearby villages, 
restricting their access to basic services in neighboring urban 
centers and violating their rights, including the right to 
health.218 The HCJ held that the military commander could have 
achieved the same security purposes by resorting to other 
measures, and the restrictions on rights were therefore 
disproportionate.219 
Several cases involved the building of the wall in Jerusalem 
and the immediate vicinity, where the wall’s route often removes 
neighborhoods from the city and from work venues as well as 
from vital education and health services.220 These decisions 
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attest to the special problems resulting from the building of the 
wall within Jerusalem, given that the partition splits not only 
the OPT but also the purportedly united city. The separation of 
East Jerusalem from the West Bank entails wider consequences 
as well because some of the main Palestinian hospitals serving 
the West Bank are in Jerusalem.221 
Due to Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem after the 1967 
war, the city’s Palestinian residents are considered residents of 
Israel and can thus enter any part of Israel,222 but the wall now 
separates even some of these citizens from the city. Health is 
only one aspect of the West Bank’s detachment from what is the 
major city in the region, as a result of Israeli policies.223 The HCJ 
recognized in some cases that the wall cut off Palestinian 
petitioners from territorial continuity with other parts of 
Jerusalem, but found the arrangement proportional. For 
example, petitioners argued in one case that the wall built 
within Jerusalem leaves them on the West Bank but leaves most 
of the services that they depend on in Jerusalem, violating their 
rights to freedom of movement, to medical care, and many 
others.224 The HCJ held in this case that the arrangement was 
proportional, resting this determination mainly on the state’s 
consent to allow passage continuously for pedestrians and 
during the daytime for vehicles.225 In another case, the HCJ 
recognized that a wall within the Jerusalem area would require 
A-Ram neighborhood residents to pass through security checks 
as they entered Jerusalem daily to work and to use public 
services, as well as on their return.226 The petitioners pointed 
out they would be detached from health services, including the 
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hospitals they use in East Jerusalem.227 They argued that in the 
neighborhoods north of Jerusalem to be detached by the wall, 
including A-Ram, there is not even one hospital.228 Although the 
Israeli Health Fund branches that they use as Israeli residents 
will remain accessible to them, they do not provide the services 
supplied by the Jerusalem hospitals from which they will now be 
separated.229 The HCJ conceded that the obstacles in their 
access to Jerusalem infringed the petitioners’ right to health.230 
In its ruling, however, the HCJ found that the security 
advantages of the wall’s planned route placed the balance struck 
by the army within the “proportionality zone,” and noted the 
importance of developing alternative medical services on the 
side of the petitioners’ residence.231 It also mentioned that 
Palestinians would be allowed to enter Jerusalem for medical 
services based on permits issued by the Israeli Civil 
Administration according to existing criteria,232 and that the 
Israeli Ministry of Health would encourage the Health Funds to 
act also “beyond the fence.”233 
In other cases involving the building of the wall in the 
Jerusalem area, Palestinian petitioners pointed to enclaves 
created by the wall that they argued were similar to the one that 
had been held to be disproportional in Mara’abe.234 The HCJ 
rejected this argument pointing to the so-called “web of life 
roads”—special roads that the army had determined that 
Palestinians living in villages affected by the wall could use to 
reach the municipal centers of Ramallah and Jerusalem.235 The 
petitioners pointed out that access to their main municipal 
center in Jerusalem through these roads would create a detour 
and require crossing an Israeli checkpoint involving a 30-45 
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minute wait.236 Nonetheless, the HCJ held this route as 
proportional even though the wall also separated villages from 
their lands and required crossing gates in order to access 
them.237 
In some cases, appeal committees that dealt with land 
confiscations for the purpose of building the wall in East 
Jerusalem decided that some of the chosen locations 
disproportionally violated rights, including the right to health 
care.238 The effect of these cases on the overall picture, however, 
seems limited.239 
Finally, a judgment dealing with the permit regime 
associated with the wall deserves mention. The HCJ ruled in 
2011 on a general petition directly challenging the permits 
regime instituted for the “seam zone.”240 This regime requires 
Palestinians to hold residency cards (given for up to a renewable 
two years) in order to live in their own homes, governs entry and 
exit into the “seam zone” (even for residents), and issues short 
or long term “personal” permits to enter the area for specific 
needs to Palestinians who are not residents.241 The petitioners 
argued that the permits regime was dispossessing the local 
population and annexing land for political purposes, 
discriminating against Palestinians, and restricting the rights of 
the Palestinian population in disproportionate fashion, 
including the right to health.242 The HCJ reiterated its holding 
in Beit Sourik and Mara’abe, stating that the barrier was being 
built for security purposes and that the permits regime in the 
“seam zone” complemented the security purposes at the heart of 
the barrier itself.243 Moving on to the violations of the 
population’s rights and without specifically addressing health 
beyond the citing to the petitioners’ arguments, the HCJ held 
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that the picture portrayed by the petitioners was indeed harsh 
insofar as people’s access to their lands was concerned.244 The 
military commander, however, had nonetheless exercised his 
authority legally, with his actions passing the proportionality 
test used in the previous case law.245 While the HCJ pointed to 
several changes it considered necessary in order to ease life for 
those in the “seam zone” or wishing to enter it,246 it upheld the 
regime and rejected the petition. In addressing the gap between 
the “harsh picture” that had been presented to it and its rejection 
of the petition, the HCJ noted that the petition’s “generality” had 
been detrimental to its cause.247 Its failure to address the fate of 
specific areas along the route of the “seam zone” had hindered 
assessment of the situation in detail, as the HCJ had done in 
dozens of previous petitions dealing with specific segments of the 
barrier.248 
Once more, then, the HCJ opted for the “separation” route, 
basing its rejection of the petition on the petitioners’ attempt to 
present the big picture and encouraging a type of litigation that 
sees the trees but not the forest. This approach, as this section 
has shown, allows for an analysis that ultimately legitimizes the 
separation barrier and the regime associated with it. The HCJ 
had endorsed a similar approach in the litigation dealing with 
the checkpoints: a refusal to deal with a generalized and 
principled petition, which may help to alleviate specific local 
problems but appears to legitimize the regime as a whole. The 
effects on access to health care continue to be felt. To cite only 
one example, consider the case of twenty-one-year-old Adel 
Omar, a resident of Azun, a Palestinian village locked in the 
seam zone where the route of the wall had been planned so as to 
protect a few settlements.249 Omar was injured in an accident, 
but the wall separated him from the nearest hospital in 
Qalqiliyah and the gate was closed at night. Omar’s friends had 
to argue with the soldiers for over an hour to persuade them to 
open the gate and let him through, by the time they reached the 
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hospital, Omar was dead.250 This is only one revealing instance 
of the wall’s harmful effects on access to health care.251 
3. Exit Permits 
Unlike the two previous categories of cases pertaining to 
movement within the West Bank (and Gaza), the cases discussed 
in this section deal mostly with Palestinians who need to exit the 
OPT for medical treatment. A number of scenarios are possible—
a need to exit the OPT for treatment in Israel (including, from 
Israel’s perspective, in East Jerusalem) or in another country; a 
need to exit Gaza (especially after the 2005 “disengagement”) for 
medical treatment in the West Bank, in Israel, or in another 
country. The need for exit permits is most common among 
residents of the West Bank and Gaza who are referred for 
treatment in East Jerusalem, home to three of the six most 
advanced Palestinian hospitals.252 In many other cases, patients 
from Gaza are referred for treatment in the West Bank and 
require a permit to go through Israel.253 Tens of thousands of 
Palestinians are also referred to facilities outside the OPT if 
means for appropriate treatment are unavailable within it, 
requiring them to travel to Jordan, Egypt, or Israel.254 
Current policies and procedures will be described below in 
detail but, usually, obtaining a permit means submitting an 
application (including medical documents) to the Israeli 
coordination and liaison authorities, which decide whether to 
approve it.255 Other cases deal with the movement of medical 
teams and medical students rather than of patients. Cases are 
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thus divided into three categories: exit from the West Bank (and 
pre-disengagement Gaza), exit from (post-disengagement) Gaza, 
and exit of medical teams and students. 
a. Exit from the West Bank (and Pre-Disengagement Gaza) 
In an early case, PHRI petitioned against the lack of clarity 
in the army’s criteria and procedures concerning patients’ 
requests for permits to exit the OPT.256 The state answered that, 
following the petition, a new procedure had been instituted on 
the matter and the petition was erased by agreement.257 But just 
as the matter of checkpoints and the procedures surrounding 
them (addressed in the same petition) reached the HCJ again, 
as noted, the matter of patients’ exit permits also returned to the 
Court. Less than a decade after the first round, PHRI petitioned 
the HCJ again and argued that the procedures adopted by the 
army in 2001 following its petition had not been fulfilled.258 The 
new petition pointed to a number of faults, of which the main 
two were the state’s failure to meet the requirement of 
submitting a medical opinion every time it denied an exit permit 
for medical reasons, and the failure to abide by the timetable 
prescribed in the procedure for regular and urgent exit permit 
requests.259 The state argued it had followed the procedure but 
would improve some of its elements, as follows: it would justify 
its denials of requests,260 it would computerize the system to 
allow the tracking of requests,261 and it would regularly provide 
information on the possibility of appealing a denied request.262 
The state also explained it was not required to provide a medical 
opinion when the refusal was based on security rather than on 
medical grounds, which was indeed the basis for most 
refusals.263 The state also added it was aware of the need for a 
swift answer, even if one was not always possible,264 and noted 
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it would consult a physician when refusing a request.265 Answers 
would be sent within a week unless the request was rejected on 
security grounds, and no later than three days before the 
requested exit date.266 Security considerations, however, could 
delay the process.267 
After a long delay in dealing with the case pending before it, 
the HCJ summarized the issues by emphasizing the 
humanitarian importance of medical treatment for those in need 
of it—be they residents and citizens of Israel, of another country, 
or even enemy nationals—while also stressing the wide margin 
of discretion the state enjoyed in this regard.268 It held that, 
while the petition was being heard, many of the matters pointed 
out by the petitioners had been answered satisfactorily.269 The 
state, the HCJ held, is attentive to the need for processing exit 
permits more efficiently.270 Timetables, however, remained a 
controversial topic. The HCJ found that the army standard 
requiring requests to be in no more than fourteen working days 
before the exit and replies to be given no more than five days 
before the date of the requested exit was reasonable, and 
rejected the petition.271 In another case, a refusal on security 
grounds that the HCJ found persuasive, the petitioner withdrew 
his petition. This case dealt with a request to allow a cancer 
patient, a 36-year-old Palestinian from Al Habala village in the 
Qalqiliya area, to enter Israel for a bone marrow test at 
Hadassah Hospital.272 The patient’s last request was denied for 
security reasons and a request sent to the Military Legal Advisor 
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was not answered.273 The state argued that, according to recent 
intelligence information, the petitioner was not allowed to enter 
Israel but could go to Jordan if he wished.274 When the HCJ 
decided that the security materials presented ex parte showed 
that the petitioner could pose a risk if he entered Israel, his 
lawyer agreed to withdraw the petition.275 
Another case dealt with a resident of the West Bank who 
asked for an exit permit to accompany his wife, a resident of 
Jaffa in Israel, for his son’s birth.276 The authorities had 
forbidden him entry “on criminal grounds,” claiming he had 
previously stayed in Israel without authorization.277 He could 
not stay in Israel with his wife since an Israeli law prevents 
Palestinians from the OPT obtaining residency in Israel even if 
married to an Israeli citizen.278 The baby was born without his 
presence. After the petition to the Court, the army agreed to 
allow him entry and, eventually, to change the procedures too so 
as to allow fathers to accompany their partners during the birth 
of their children.279 This arrangement, which took on the status 
of a judicial verdict, stated that the procedure for approving 
Palestinians’ requests for permits to obtain medical treatment 
and accompany patients would be amended to state “including a 
woman giving birth.”280 
The current military order determines that West Bank 
residents should be allowed, barring security grounds, to obtain 
medical treatment in the OPT, in Israel, or abroad.281 The order 
covers movement from the OPT to Israel and abroad at “routine” 
times as well, as during full closure of the OPT, internal closure, 
or “encirclement” of a certain area.282 (This procedure is separate 
from the one discussed above, which dealt with emergency cases 
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of Palestinians reaching checkpoints within the West Bank). It 
specifically states that it is based on the state’s commitment to 
the HCJ, highlighting the central role that litigation played in 
this matter.283 Moreover, it may also indicate that in this context 
(unlike that of the checkpoints and the wall), the HCJ agreed to 
hear and decide on a generalized petition, allowing for actual 
policy change through impact litigation rather than merely 
alleviating some individual or local circumstances.284 The order 
contains forms that West Bank residents seeking exit permits to 
Israel for medical treatment must fill out and the modes of 
submitting them.285 It also notes that no permit is needed to exit 
abroad for medical treatment via Jordan except for cases 
involving security reasons, though residents can still apply 
under this procedure even if such reasons exist.286 Requests 
must include updated medical records and an invitation by the 
medical institute in Israel or abroad, and also in the West Bank 
if the request entails movement within the West Bank at times 
of internal restrictions.287 The order notes that requests would 
be processed as quickly as possible given the importance of 
medical treatment.288 Generally, then, during “routine” times, 
requests will not be denied if a medical problem is indeed present 
and an invitation by a medical institution in Israel is included, 
all so long as the person is not prevented (on security grounds) 
from entering Israel. For “exceptional reasons,” the request may 
be approved even if one of the conditions is not fulfilled.289 
Additionally, reasons must be given for all denials.290 The order 
also states that when the Israeli army imposes a general closure 
on certain areas or when the request pertains to someone who is 
denied entry into Israel for security reasons, the permit will still 
be approved if it is urgent and/or if it concerns a lifesaving 
treatment unavailable in the West Bank, such as radiation, 
transplants, cardiac catheterization, and dialysis for children.291 
Such requests will be refused on security grounds only after 
considering all the alternatives, and refusals must be 
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justified.292 At times of internal closure within the West Bank, a 
person scheduled for medical treatment within the West Bank 
will generally be allowed to exit.293 The rules in force are similar 
to those stated above. 
Further rules deal with exceptional requests concerning 
traveling abroad through the Israeli airport to Palestinians who 
are refused entry to Israel, which will usually not be approved 
unless pertaining to an emergency treatment unavailable in the 
area.294 Additionally, the “permits status” document issued by 
the army in 2016 lists three purposes of entry for medical 
reasons: medical reasons for cancer and dialysis patients, 
patients with chronic diseases, and invitations from hospitals; 
accompanying a hospitalized or chronically ill family member, 
and visiting a sick family member.295 
An additional IDF procedure, published in October 2017, 
determines a twenty-three-day period (not including holidays 
and weekends) for processing health-related permits for Gaza 
residents,296 while also stating that permits will be processed 
immediately in urgent cases (“life-saving” situations).297 
These rules, and especially the procedures for submitting 
exit permits requests, reveal a bureaucratic structure that, 
barring security considerations, holds that exit for medical 
treatment should generally be allowed. This structure does show 
the effects of litigation while also pointing to the limits of the 
humanitarian arrangement where the Palestinians’ basic right 
to freedom of movement for any purpose, in this case for health, 
depends on the occupier’s willingness to establish a 
bureaucratic-humanitarian regime. This is obviously better 
than a policy that generally forbids exit, but also points to the 
basic problem of movement restrictions and dependence on a 
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permit for what should be a basic human right. 
b. Exit from Post-Disengagement Gaza 
In the generalized case dealing with exit permits discussed 
in the previous section, the distinction became apparent between 
the West Bank and Gaza. The petition was submitted in 2005 
but the judgment was issued in 2010, and the disengagement 
occurred while it was pending.298 The HCJ cited the state’s 
response clarifying that, even before 2005, the procedure that 
applied regarding Gaza residents was different from the one in 
the West Bank.299 Regarding the West Bank, the inclination was 
to approve requests for medical treatment in Israel in the 
absence of security reasons.300 Regarding Gaza, however, deeper 
probes were conducted and, because of the higher security risks, 
options for alternative treatment were examined.301 The HCJ 
held that, after the disengagement, the Israeli military 
commander is no longer present in Gaza and requests must be 
addressed to the Israeli Ministry of Interior.302 However, the 
procedure stipulated in the order de facto applies to Gazans too, 
even if they have no right to enter Israel.303 But, the army noted 
that circumstances in Gaza after the rise of the Hamas 
government preclude implementation of a rigid timetable for 
answering exit permits requests.304 In another decision 
pertaining to Gaza residents that wanted to enter Israel for 
medical treatment, the HCJ held that, after the end of the 
military administration, authority to allow Gazans to enter 
Israel rests with the Israeli Minister of Interior.305 This points 
to the perception of post-disengagement Gaza as a foreign entity 
rather than as occupied territory, a perception supposedly 
imposing fewer duties on Israel.306 
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The effects of this view of Gaza as a territory beyond Israel’s 
responsibility is apparent in cases involving the movement of 
Gaza residents, especially when they wish to enter Israel. 
Although entry from the OPT into Israel has been limited, in 
different forms, since the early 1990s, the disengagement 
allowed the HCJ to deal with them as requests by residents of 
an enemy state rather than as individuals to whom Israel, as an 
occupying power, owes a special duty. For example, in a case 
involving a Gaza resident seeking to enter Israel for essential 
chemotherapy, the HCJ accepted the state’s denial of the request 
because he was claimed to pose a security threat.307 The HCJ 
approached the request as if the petitioner were from a foreign 
country and, indeed, an enemy country, to be handled by Israel 
strictly on a voluntary humanitarian basis.308 This patient was 
nevertheless allowed to enter Israel for medical treatment 
contingent on a security guard being attached to him—at his 
expense.309 The petitioner argued that he required the special 
expertise available at Israeli hospitals but the HCJ held that, 
although providing lifesaving medical treatment is a meaningful 
humanitarian value, it does not override other important 
interests, especially the protection of public security.310 Allowing 
a “foreign resident” to enter Israel for medical treatment is a 
matter within the discretion of the Israeli government, and each 
case should be examined individually while taking all 
considerations into account. The state should balance the need 
to grant humanitarian assistance on the one hand against the 
assessment of security risks on the other, whenever information 
on such risks is available.311 The court also noted that the 
petitioner could exit Gaza to Egypt or Jordan for medical 
treatment there or exit from Egypt or Jordan to a third 
country.312 
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Another case dealt with eleven Gaza residents who had not 
been allowed to exit Gaza to enter Israel for medical 
treatment.313 During the hearings, the state announced that 
some would be allowed to exit through Egypt instead.314 The 
petitioners again argued for a duty of the state and the state 
argued it had no duties in this regard.315 The HCJ said it would 
not enter the legal question of Gaza’s status since it was doubtful 
that this consideration could be helpful regarding humanitarian 
issues, and suggested that the state reconsider its decision so as 
to allow medical treatment while minimizing security risks.316 
The HCJ kept the case open until the state eventually reported 
that six petitioners had entered Israel; one is in a Hamas prison, 
one was hospitalized in Gaza, one was awaiting a visa to Egypt, 
one had died, and one had entered Egypt.317 The HCJ then held 
that the case had been exhausted.318 
In another case, and based on information provided by the 
army, the HCJ accepted that there was a linkage between the 
petitioners seeking medical treatment and terrorist groups.319 
The HCJ therefore “recommended” that the state transfer the 
petitioners to medical centers in Jordan in a security escorted 
ambulance, given that passage to Egypt was closed from the 
Egyptian side at the time.320 
The Israeli authorities specifically noted in other hearings 
as well that Palestinians have no right to enter Israel and Israel 
holds no legal responsibility for events in Gaza.321 Nevertheless, 
Israel does coordinate with the Palestinian authorities the 
allocation of permits to enter or pass through Israel for medical 
purposes in cases involving life-saving situations, and a 
significant number of such permits have been granted.322 The 
HCJ also noted that distinguishing between life-saving and 
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quality of life treatments (which may include saving a patient’s 
eyesight or a limb) may at times be hard, and cases must be 
examined individually.323 The HCJ again held here that, given 
the urgency of the request, it would not enter into questions 
touching on the status of Gaza and of Israel’s legal duties or lack 
thereof, even if they had come up in the parties’ submissions.324 
Instead, the HCJ, said it would limit itself to the “operative 
common denominator, that is, to the humanitarian aspects by 
virtue of which the state too is ready to treat patients who 
require urgent life-saving medical treatment.”325 This case is one 
of many where the HCJ avoided any determination on duties 
and took the supposedly pragmatic course which resulted in 
helping some but came too late for at least one. Another one of 
these cases dealt with Gaza residents who wanted to enter 
Israel, some for medical treatment and others for passage to 
Jordan and Egypt.326 While some petitioners were allowed entry 
while the petition was pending, others were denied permits on 
security grounds.327 After examining secret documents 
presented by the state and given the army’s insistence on 
security risks, the HCJ decided to abstain from intervention, 
even though some of the petitioners were clearly in need of 
urgent medical treatment.328 Israel said it would allow their exit 
to Egypt when passage from Gaza to Egypt (closed at the time) 
reopened or, failing that, would consider allowing exit to 
Jordan.329 
Another refusal occurred in a 2016 decision concerning a 
petitioner who suffered from a heart problem. He asked to enter 
the West Bank through Israel or to enter Israel to have an 
isotopic heart scan at an Israeli hospital.330 A medical opinion 
handed to the court on the petitioner’s behalf determined that 
failure to perform the scan would put the petitioner at 
unnecessary risk.331 The respondents argued that the petitioner 
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had participated in terrorist activities in the past and was in 
contact with terrorist operatives, and refused him the permit.332 
The HCJ rejected the petition and held that the “balance” struck 
by the respondent had not been unreasonable.333 Failure to 
perform the examination would not put the petitioner in mortal 
danger, and catheterization, for which the patient had been 
referred originally, was available in Gaza.334 Deputy Chief 
Justice Rubinstein suggested in a dissenting opinion that, since 
this is a medical subject involving potential risks, a cardiologist 
attesting for the respondents should issue an opinion on the 
abstention from the examination.335 The majority justices, 
however, held that the medical opinion submitted by the 
petitioner, which had not been disputed by the army, made this 
action superfluous.336 This case again reflects the trumping 
nature of security arguments.337 
One rare instance of PHRI successfully overturning alleged 
security considerations dealt with a Gaza resident suffering 
from colorectal cancer.338 The PA referred her for treatment at 
Makassed Hospital and later at Hadassah Hospital in Israel.339 
The frequent treatments began at the end of June 2016.340 In 
October 2016, the state refused to allow the patient to attend 
additional treatments at Hadassah claiming security reasons.341 
PHRI then filed a petition on behalf of the patient at the Beer 
Sheva Administrative Court.342 The Court was asked to allow 
the petitioner to enter Hadassah or Makassed hospitals for 
urgent medical treatments that are not available in Gaza.343 The 
petition claimed that, without those treatments, her situation 
could deteriorate and that waiting for treatment would involve 
unnecessary suffering.344 The petition was finally erased on the 
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morning of the hearing due to the state’s consent to allow the 
petitioner’s entry.345 The state was also required to pay the 
petitioner’s damages.346 
Current Israeli military orders on exit from Gaza to Israel 
thus determine that, barring security grounds, requests will be 
approved in medical cases. The procedure also includes a 
mechanism for reconsideration upon request.347 The “permits 
status” document issued in 2016 lists the medical-related 
reasons that residents of Gaza can adduce in requests to enter 
Israel: (1) the need for life-saving treatment (or one without 
which the nature of life “totally changes”) that is unavailable in 
Gaza, to be provided in Israel, the West Bank, or abroad, (2) 
professional training and specialization in hospitals in Israel or 
the West Bank that can strengthen medical services given to 
Gaza residents in cases of risk to life or ones without which the 
nature of life “totally changes,” (3) visiting a first-degree family 
member who is seriously ill with a disease that is life-risking or 
requires long hospitalization (in Israel, the West Bank, or 
abroad), (4) specialized organized tours for sick children and 
children with special needs.348 The same document also allows 
West Bank residents to enter Gaza for exceptional humanitarian 
reasons—visiting a first-degree family member seriously ill with 
a disease that may be life-threatening or requires long 
hospitalization.349 Health issues, then, are subject to the same 
apparatus of bureaucratic occupation that Palestinians are 
subjected to generally—one that judicial review may have 
helped to create. 
Testimonies from June 2017 indicate that the PA had been 
blocking the exit of patients from Gaza for medical treatment for 
two months, as part of the power struggle between the PA and 
Hamas.350 In July 2017, the Gazan Ministry of Health reported 
that a three-year-old girl was the sixteenth victim of “Ramallah’s 
delays in providing approval and financial commitments for 
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treatment in Israeli hospitals.”351 The PA and the Ministry of 
Health in Ramallah denied claims of a change in policy, and 
blamed both Hamas and Israel for the situation.352 
c. Summing Up: Exit Permits for Patients—Rights or 
Bureaucracy? 
The bureaucratic mechanism described above creates 
various procedural problems, including difficulty accessing 
coordination and liaison authorities.353 A 2004 report described 
the complex bureaucracy involved in obtaining various kinds of 
permits for Palestinians who need to travel.354 The report 
mentioned disruptions in communication, arbitrariness, and 
lack of transparency, stressing the bureaucratic violence 
apparent in the waiting for a permit that may or may not come, 
the lack of information about the process, and the creation of a 
mechanism for controlling individuals asking for a permit 
without any discussion of rights.355 One example of a 
bureaucratic restriction, though no longer in force, affected 
displaced Palestinians who lived in Gaza but were not registered 
in the Israeli-controlled population registry and, in the past, had 
been prevented from applying for exit permits to Israel.356 At 
least in one case, this restriction led to the death of a cancer 
patient who could not obtain a permit despite repeated advocacy 
on her behalf.357 Although the army agreed in 2014 to cancel this 
restriction, the change came too late for her.358 
Requiring permits for exit allows Israel to exercise great 
control over Palestinians. A PHRI report issued in 2015 points 
to technical and substantial failures in the conduct of the Israeli 
coordination and liaison authorities.359 Palestinian patients and 
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their companions must submit to security interrogations as a 
prerequisite for an exit permit for medical treatment.360 This 
practice was actually reviewed by the HCJ in a case where 
petitioners argued that the questioning, beyond relevant 
medical information, also seeks information about others and 
demands that permit seekers become collaborators.361 The HCJ 
rejected this argument, relying on the security services’ 
declaration that they do not use a person’s illness for the purpose 
of attaining security information.362 In 2015, however, for the 
very first time, an official Israeli representative made a 
statement supporting this claim.363 
Security is clearly the overarching factor. A person who 
would otherwise meet the criteria can be denied a permit 
because she or he is considered to be a security risk. The basis 
for this category is hardly ever exposed to the patient (and, at 
best, is only given to the Court ex parte). This illustrates the one-
sided nature of “security”—the Palestinians’ security is not part 
of the security consideration, even though Palestinians may 
have humanitarian considerations on their side.364 
A 2015 PHRI report also points to delays in checkpoints and 
to the rejection of exit permits applications that may lead to 
deterioration of the person’s condition and to premature 
death.365 In 2014, PHRI recorded two cases of patients who died 
after being denied passage for medical treatment.366 During 2015, PHRI documented yet another case of a cancer patient 
residing in Gaza, who died after being denied passage to be 
treated at Ichilov Hospital in Tel Aviv.367 According to the 2015 
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and 2016 reports, about twenty percent of the applications for 
exit permits were rejected.368 Almost half of these rejections 
were eventually overturned following PHRI’s intervention, 
meaning that even the Israeli authorities ultimately decided 
they had been unfounded.369 In some of the other cases, referrals 
were diverted to Egyptian hospitals370—not an easy solution 
given the frequent closure of the Rafah crossing between Gaza 
and Egypt. 
The report also discloses that, out of almost 300 cases that 
PHRI considered in 2014, about two-thirds were from Gaza and 
less than a third from the West Bank.371 The gap was even bigger 
in 2016: 223 requests were received from the Gaza Strip 
compared to 20 from the West Bank.372 Also worth noting is the 
increase in the number of requests PHRI received in 2015 from 
cancer and heart patients (68) whose applications for exit 
permits for medical treatment were denied or delayed.373 This 
figure represents an increase of more than one hundred percent 
over 2014 and may reflect a tougher policy on the transit of 
patients from Gaza,374 with the percentage of approvals of exit 
requests from Gaza dropping by thirteen percent.375 PHRI also 
pointed to a tougher policy concerning the transit of patients 
whose medical condition (even if not life-threatening) requires 
treatment unavailable where they live, and the passage of 
escorts accompanying patients.376 These changes underscore 
that access to health care for Palestinians is a function of a 
changing Israeli policy rather than a recognized human right, as 
indicated by the decreasing number of approved requests, with 
delays and refusals reportedly leading to twenty deaths of 
 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. For a detailed discussion of the referrals and permits system and of 
cases denied, see WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 255. See also 
WHO, RIGHT TO HEALTH: CROSSING BARRIERS TO ACCESS HEALTH IN THE 
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY (2013), http://www.emro.who.int/images/
stories/palestine/documents/WHO-RTH_crossing_barriers_to_access_health.
pdf?ua=1; WHO, BARRIERS TO HEALTH ACCESS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN 
TERRITORY, 2011 and 2012 (2013), http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/
palestine/documents/WHO_Access_Report-March_5_2013.pdf. 
 372. PHRI, supra note 255, at 10. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. at 13. 
 375. Id. at 10. 
 376. Id. at 6. 
474 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2 
Palestinians in Gaza.377 
Overall, dependence on exit permits for health is part of the 
complex permits regime in the OPT.378 Shenhav and Berda, 
Israeli scholars, point out how the Israeli military 
administration in the West Bank uses uncertainty and 
ambiguity as a means of asserting authority and suppressing 
rebellion.379 Not knowing whether you will get a permit is part 
of that uncertainty. The permits regime, of which permits for 
health reasons are but a part, restricts freedom of movement and 
is one of the major aspects of Israel’s excessive control over the 
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Palestinians’ daily lives.380 
d. Exit Permits: Medical Staff and Students 
Cases dealing with exit permits affect the movement of 
medical teams too. Some of them are part of the problem noted 
above—the detachment of East Jerusalem from the West Bank. 
One early case dealt with the problems that hospitals in East 
Jerusalem confronted when a closure was imposed on the West 
Bank and the residents they employed could not reach them.381 
Following the petition, the state issued permits to essential 
workers, which led to the petition being rejected.382 In another 
case, the HCJ rejected the petition of a Palestinian who had 
worked for fourteen years as a nurse in an East Jerusalem 
hospital.383 When his entry permit to Israel expired, the army 
refused to renew it for security reasons.384 After seeing the secret 
files provided by the General Security Services, the HCJ 
conveyed its negative impression from them to the petitioner, 
who withdrew the petition.385 Another case dealt with a medical 
student from Al-Quds University in the West Bank, who wanted 
to enter Israel for clinical studies and training at Makassed 
Hospital in East Jerusalem.386 The authorities refused him entry 
on security grounds and noted that, as in many other cases, 
decisions to allow entry are a privilege granted at the state’s 
discretion.387 The HCJ, after reviewing the security documents 
ex parte, clarified to the petitioner that he was allegedly a 
member of a terrorist group, a fact that he denied.388 The HCJ 
rejected the petition, noting it would expect a person choosing 
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the medical profession to avoid illegal acts and hoped for a 
solution but, absent one, it would not rush to intervene in the 
state’s exercise of its privilege to decide who would enter.389 The 
HCJ rejected arguments founded on Israel’s duties toward the 
local population (including health care under GCIV Article 56) 
and determined that the provision of medical services does not 
depend on any particular individual.390 
Other HCJ decisions involving Gazans who requested 
permits to enter the West Bank reflect a further effect of the 
disengagement on health care, this time involving medical 
studies. The HCJ twice rejected the petition of a group of 
students who had received scholarships to study occupational 
therapy in the West Bank, a course that is not available in 
Gaza.391 Israel classified individuals aged sixtenn to thrty-five 
as a risk group and banned their entry into the West Bank even 
though, individually, they did not pose a security risk.392 The 
state argued that, even if these students entered the West Bank 
without any intention of engaging in terrorist activities, they 
might be influenced by the surroundings.393 In its submission, 
the State distinguished between the Gaza Strip, no longer being 
under Israeli belligerent occupation, and the West Bank, an area 
that still was, with Israel holding overall responsibility for 
security.394 Israel refused to treat this as a humanitarian case 
and allow the students to enter even for the two months of 
clinical training needed to complete their degree, for which they 
had studied online.395 In another case, which involved students 
who wanted to move from the West Bank to pursue studies in 
Gaza, the HCJ upheld the army’s decision based on its policy not 
to allow such moves except for humanitarian reasons.396 The 
HCJ noted that this position reflected Israel’s wish to separate 
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the West Bank, controlled by the PA, from the Gaza Strip, 
controlled by a terrorist group.397 The state outlined to the Court 
its policy that the law of belligerent occupation no longer applies 
in Gaza and, therefore, Israel bears only humanitarian duties 
toward its population.398 This argument again illustrates how 
the disengagement allowed Israel to continue—and transform—
its control without responsibility. The State still provided details 
from cases of entry into Israel from Gaza as well as entry into 
Gaza on grounds other than health care.399 While describing the 
situation as “almost desperate,”400 the HCJ rejected the petition; 
however, one of the three presiding judges opined in a dissent 
that the army should be mandated to establish a special 
“exceptions committee.”401 Note that entering Israel is crucial 
not only for Gazans who need to do so for medical treatment or 
for study purposes, 402 but also for any Gaza resident who wishes 
to travel to the West Bank or to Jordan precisely for these 
reasons or for any other. 
Seeing this question in the broader context of restrictions on 
freedom of movement, recall that, because of the closure imposed 
on Gaza’s airspace, any Gaza resident wanting to fly out from an 
Israeli or a Jordanian airport must pass through Israel. Given 
that the Rafah crossing to Egypt opened up only on a limited 
basis throughout most of the period discussed here, and given 
the distance between Gaza and Cairo that makes travel 
particularly challenging for sick people, the effect of the Israeli 
closure on Gaza residents has been significant. The situation is 
dynamic, with new rules issued frequently.403 
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III. THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND 
MEDICAL TEAMS DURING MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 
The second major category of cases discussed by the HCJ 
regarding the right to health of Palestinians in the OPT concerns 
the protection of civilians and of medical teams wishing to assist 
Palestinians at the time of hostilities. These cases were litigated 
in real time, and the Israeli Supreme Court took what can be 
described as a “managerial” position, reiterating the applicable 
norms of IHL and mostly hearing from both sides, while 
obtaining guarantees from the army about its actions and trying 
to improve the situation on the ground. Some of these cases dealt 
with the possibility of access for medical teams and the 
evacuation of wounded people, with the army guaranteeing it 
would abide by its IHL duties. The cases again follow the 
political developments, this time the rounds of heightened 
hostilities in the OPT since the early 2000s.404 
During the 2002 Israeli army operation in Jenin known as 
“Defensive Shield,” PHRI petitioned the HCJ. In response, the 
army declared it was abiding by IHL and consequently, the 
parties agreed to withdraw the petition.405 Several weeks later, 
as hostilities continued, two more cases brought by PHRI came 
before the HCJ, with the Israeli army allegedly firing on Red 
Crescent ambulances.406 In its response, the State conceded that 
the “objective situation regarding treatment of wounded 
people”407 was not easy and that shots had been fired at a 
Palestinian ambulance.408 However, the army claimed that 
Palestinians had previously transferred explosives in 
ambulances.409 
 
 
 
 
 404. See ZIV, supra note 6, at 57–63. 
 405. HCJ 1985/02 PHRI v. The Commander of the IDF Forces in the West 
Bank (Mar. 5, 2002), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 406. HCJ 2117/02 PHRI v. The Commander of the IDF Forces in the West 
Bank (Apr. 28, 2002), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); HCJ 2936/02 
PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank (Apr. 8, 2002), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 407. HCJ 2117/02 PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank 
(Apr. 28, 2002), ¶ 1, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 408. Id. ¶ 4. 
 409. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. 
2018] RIGHT TO HEALTH UNDER OCCUPATION 479 
The State argued the army was nevertheless committed to 
abide by its obligations under international law and had 
instructed all warring forces to act accordingly.410 In one of these 
cases, the HCJ noted that, given the army’s declaration of its 
commitment to humanitarian rules and the instructions to the 
soldiers to abide by them, the petition could be rejected.411 As for 
the second case, the HCJ found that the petition was “forward 
looking.”412 It cited the First Geneva Convention, which deals 
with the amelioration of conditions for the wounded and the sick 
among armed forces in the field,413 rather than GCIV, thus 
presumably turning this into a matter related to armed forces 
rather than civilians. This choice raises a host of questions about 
the classification and status of Palestinian combatants. 
Although, these are beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
beneficial to discuss them briefly. Specifically, the HCJ cited 
Articles 19, 21, 24, and 26 of the First Geneva Convention, which 
prohibit attacks on fixed or mobile medical units.414 The HCJ 
noted that Article 24 deals with the respect due to medical 
personnel “exclusively” engaged in the search of or the collection, 
transport, or treatment of the wounded or sick and in other 
medical roles.415 It also cited Article 21, which determines that 
the protection to which medical units are entitled may cease if 
they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts 
harmful to the enemy, but only after due warning has been 
given, after granting reasonable time for compliance, and after 
such warning has remained unheeded.416 Citing this 
background, the HCJ reiterated its determination in the first of 
the two twin cases, whereby abuses of medical teams by 
Palestinians may require the Israeli army to prevent such 
activities but does not allow broad violation of humanitarian 
rules.417 The HCJ emphasized that concrete instructions should 
be issued to and complied with by the combatting forces to show 
commitment to humanitarian rules, and they should be 
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“balanced” against the risks posed by the Palestinians who, 
according to the Israeli army, are involved in combat while 
disguised as medical teams.418 
The HCJ again confronted the issue of medical teams during 
Israel’s military activity in Rafah in 2004. Various human rights 
groups, spearheaded by PHRI, demanded that the army allow 
medical teams and ambulances to evacuate people who had been 
wounded in Rafah.419 They demanded that the evacuation be 
conducted without need for prior coordination with a 
“humanitarian hotline” established by the army, that the 
movement of medical equipment between Rafah and hospitals 
outside it be allowed and medical teams or civilians who 
evacuate the wounded or the dead not be hurt or threatened.420 
They also demanded that supplies of electricity, water, food, and 
medicine be renewed to certain areas, and that a delegation of 
physicians on behalf of PHRI be allowed to visit Gaza 
hospitals.421 The army argued that, since the litigation was 
being conducted while hostilities were still ongoing, the HCJ 
should beware of intervening, as the issue could hardly be 
considered justiciable.422 The army explained that the purpose 
of the operation was to prevent terrorism and these cases were 
difficult as terrorists operate amidst a civilian population.423 In 
its judgment, the HCJ emphasized that all the army’s combat 
activities are subject to the pertinent rules of international 
law.424 It also stressed that, although judicial review is usually 
conducted ex post factum, in this case the judicial review 
requested is ex ante, while hostilities are taking place.425 The 
HCJ determined that the relevant normative framework for its 
decision includes the Hague Convention, the GCIV, and 
principles of Israeli administrative law binding on all Israeli 
soldiers.426 It cited provisions regarding respect for protected 
persons,427 and GCIV articles dealing with the supply of food, 
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medicine, and consignments as well as the operation of medical 
bodies in the area.428 Addressing the petitioners’ specific claims, 
the HCJ said it had requested and received answers from the 
army on all the issues that had been raised. Among the answers, 
the HCJ cited: 
Medical equipment and drugs: The petitioners had argued 
that the relevant hospital suffered from a serious shortage of 
medications, medical equipment, and blood.429 A car with 
equipment and supplies prepared by PHRI had not been allowed 
to enter the area.430 In its answer, the army noted that medical 
equipment and drugs are regularly allowed to enter, describing 
detailed discussions conducted with the director of the hospital, 
who had reported that blood supplies were no longer lacking but 
the shortage of first aid equipment continued.431 The army 
conveyed that Red Cross trucks had entered the area with 
medications and four trucks with medical equipment had “just” 
passed an Israeli crossing.432 After this account, the HCJ stated 
it was the duty of the military commander to guarantee the 
availability of medical equipment in the area and to ensure the 
ability of local hospitals to treat patients.433 Medical equipment 
should be prepared in advance for a situation of shortage and 
allowed to enter the area from various sources. If possible, the 
HCJ added, the army and local medical services should remain 
in regular contact.434 These are duties of the military 
commander, and no external agency can relieve him from them. 
The HCJ then noted that, based on the facts presented, this 
issue appears to be resolved now, leaving no room for judicial 
intervention.435 
Evacuation of injured people: The petitioners argued that 
roads to Rafah were blocked and ambulance movement was 
restricted.436 The army answered that it allows the entry of 
ambulances and medical teams in coordination with various 
bodies, arguing that some restrictions had been required 
because terrorists had in the past used ambulances to transfer 
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combatants and weapons.437 Checking ambulances was thus 
required, but the cost is a delay of only a few minutes and the 
instruction is to refrain from shooting at ambulances.438 The 
HCJ then stated that the normative aspect is not contested and 
that the army must do everything possible to allow the 
evacuation of wounded local residents.439 It also held that the 
transfer of ambulances to Rafah and back had seemed proper, 
instructions had been clear and unequivocal, and the petition 
had been satisfied.440 
Visits of medical teams: The army replied there were no 
restrictions on physicians’ visits, no matter if they were from the 
ICRC, or were non-Israelis working in Israeli hospitals or in the 
West Bank and Gaza.441 Israeli doctors were not allowed in Gaza 
(by Israel) given the risk to their security.442 The HCJ held that 
the army was solely guided by security considerations about the 
risks to Israelis in Gaza.443 
In sum, the HCJ held that military actions in accordance 
with IHL requires the reiteration of rules of behavior and the 
creation of institutional tools to enable their fulfillment.444 It 
remarked that, compared to the cases addressed two years 
previously (cited above) much progress had seemingly been 
made.445 The Court emphasized that the army played not only a 
“negative” role but also a “positive” one—protecting the local 
residents.446 Accordingly, military procedures must also help to 
solve new problems that may arise. The HCJ favorably noted 
that the army would appoint a senior officer who would be in 
direct contact with the petitioning non-governmental 
organizations.447 
The third and so far last round of judgments issued during 
hostilities dates back to 2009, during the “Cast Lead” Israeli 
operation in Gaza. PHRI and other non-governmental 
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organizations petitioned the HCJ to protest delays in the 
evacuation of the injured from Gaza to hospitals, Israeli army 
attacks on ambulances and medical teams, and the lack of 
electricity in Gaza that undermined the functioning of hospitals, 
clinics, and the water and sewage systems.448 The army, after 
repeating its previous arguments regarding justiciability, noted 
it had abided by IHL and had fulfilled its duties as held in the 
Rafah case.449 It also noted, however, that Israel was no longer 
occupying Gaza and did not have a military commander in the 
area or any contact with the Hamas regime.450 Humanitarian 
coordination is arranged vis-à-vis international groups and the 
Palestinian civil committee in Ramallah.451 The army also 
described the operational layout it had established to allow for 
humanitarian assistance,452 and it noted that an order was in 
place to avoid attacking medical teams fulfilling their roles 
unless it was known they were being abused for combat.453 
The HCJ reiterated its statement on judicial review from 
previous cases, noting the difficulty of collecting reliable data 
while belligerencies continue. In such cases, it said, the Court’s 
judicial review focused on sustaining the applicable 
international legal norms and those from Israeli administrative 
law.454 It cited the normative framework of armed conflict, 
leaving open (as it had in some of the exit permit cases discussed 
above) the question of the relevance of occupation law to Gaza 
and naming sources similar to those cited in previous cases.455 
After considering the army’s description of the humanitarian 
apparatus it had set up, the HCJ said it hoped it would fulfill the 
army’s duties under IHL, which the army had not denied.456 The 
HCJ was also satisfied that the army had tried to fix the 
problems affecting the supply of electricity, food, and 
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medicine.457 
Empirical studies exceeding the scope of this article are 
needed to discern how much the litigation in all these cases 
affected reality on the ground. Except for the question of 
whether duties incumbent on the occupier continue to apply in 
Gaza, there was no controversy in these cases concerning the 
applicable norms on the one hand, and the “facts” on the ground 
while litigation was ongoing on the other. The role of the HCJ, 
in its own perception, was limited to declaring the norms while 
encouraging the army to act toward their implementation and 
ease humanitarian relief under its aegis.458 These cases raise 
complex questions about the role of the HCJ in these situations: 
Is it ameliorative? Does it force the army to recall IHL duties it 
would have neglected otherwise? To what extent are the letter 
and spirit of IHL duties preserved in reality, given the many 
reports of violations, and what role, if any, did the HCJ 
determination play on effecting this? 
No petitions were submitted to the HCJ during the latest 
round of hostilities in Gaza in 2014, even if attacks on medical 
personnel and medical facilities, including hospitals, were 
reported. Reports on the 2014 conflict also pointed to the failure 
of the coordination mechanism for injured people, which 
sometimes took ten hours instead of ten minutes and, in some 
cases, took seven or eight days or failed altogether.459 These 
reports of violations in the most recent round do raise questions 
about the effect of the litigation in previous rounds on army 
policies 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The litigation concerning the right to health in the OPT 
brings up questions very different from those raised in domestic 
litigation. This litigation has mostly dealt with physical access 
to health care and with the problems resulting from restrictions 
on freedom of movement within and outside the OPT, while some 
cases have focused on protection during hostilities. A great deal 
of litigation that was not specifically focused on access, however, 
is relevant to matters affecting health care. These matters 
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include, for example, allowing Israel to reduce the supply of 
electricity and fuel to Gaza to the humanitarian minimum,460 
the rights of Palestinian prisoners and forced feeding of hunger 
strikers,461 and extensive individual litigation about who is 
considered a “resident” of East Jerusalem and hence of Israel, 
consequently entitled to access to Israel’s National Health 
Insurance.462 Often, this litigation did not result in a court 
judgment but in some sort of ad hoc response, frequently in the 
form of an out-of-court settlement. 
The HCJ has tended to elude questions of principle, 
especially regarding the status of Gaza and Israel’s duties in its 
regard, favoring instead pragmatic solutions. As noted in the 
cases concerning the checkpoints and the wall, the HCJ refused 
to endorse an overall perspective, such as the one adopted by the 
ICJ, and addressed only local, specific cases, even when 
providing a localized remedy, thereby legitimizing the regime as 
such.463 Litigation before the HCJ concerning exit permits seems 
to have played a significant role in the shaping of the army’s 
procedures, especially regarding the West Bank, probably 
because this was the one area where the HCJ did agree to deal 
with a general petition. The result was the bureaucratic permits 
regime discussed above. Regarding post-disengagement Gaza, 
the picture is different because the HCJ has generally accepted 
the position that Israel does not have the duties of an occupier 
towards its residents. Although in many of these cases the HCJ 
 
 460. See, e.g., HCJ 4258/08 Gisha Legal Center for Freedom of Movement v. 
Minister of Defense (June 5, 2008), (Isr.); HCJ 9132/07  Al-Bassiouni v. Prime 
Minister and Defense Minister of Israel (Jan. 30, 2008), (Isr.). The continuing 
electricity crisis in the Gaza Strip, fueled by disagreements between Hamas and 
the PA and a lack of any operative steps taken by Israel on the matter, has led 
to eighteen to twenty-hour power cuts a day, placing an increasing burden on 
health facilities in Gaza. Electricity fluctuations have damaged medical 
equipment, with over 150 medical machines currently out of order. The 
electricity crisis is also affecting acceptable standards for collecting, storing, and 
transporting blood. With funding from the Central Emergency Relief Fund 
(CERF) and other donors, life-saving services have been maintained. See 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO SPECIAL SITUATION REPORT GAZA, 
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY OCTOBER TO NOVEMBER (2017). 
 461. See, e.g., HCJ 452/16 Al-Kik v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West 
Bank (Feb. 16, 2016), (Isr.); HCJ 7837/04 Adalah v. Prison Service & the 
Minister of Public Security (Sep. 14, 2004), (Isr.). 
 462. See, e.g., Labor Court (Jer.)  1241/98 Samar Abu-Sanina v. Social 
Security – Jerusalem (Aug. 27, 2002), (Isr.); Labor Court Appeal 1394/02 Samar 
Abu-Sanina v. Social Security (Mar. 16, 2004), (Isr.); Civil Request (Jer.) 
1280/06 Zahada Hussina v. Social Security (Apr. 6, 2006) (Isr.). 
 463. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE (2002); Shamir, 
supra note 196. 
486 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2 
said it would sidestep issues of principle on the status of Gaza 
and Israel’s duties, it did, in fact, adopt the state’s position,464 
while still attempting to prod the state to adopt measures based 
on humanitarian grounds rather than on rights or duties. 
In cases concerning hostilities, the HCJ cited the 
overarching applicable norms from IHL usually missing from 
the freedom of movement cases, but at times declaring norms 
more than actually examining the scope of their implementation. 
This approach can be understood in a wider context—given 
Israel’s denial of the applicability of GCIV to the OPT and the 
HCJ’s doubts about its enforceability,465 the HCJ finds it easier 
to address IHL norms on belligerency than norms on occupation. 
Although the HCJ does often engage with the law of occupation, 
it does so more easily with the Hague Regulations than with the 
Geneva Convention, perhaps clarifying the latter’s 
disappearance from most of the cases that bring up health duties 
as an occupier rather than as a belligerent party. 
The notion of access to health care that was developed in 
international human rights law is relevant in these cases, and 
the HCJ determined that human rights law applies in the OPT 
alongside IHL. Nevertheless, the HCJ never turned to 
international human rights law on the right to health in such 
cases, although occasionally referred to the right to health 
generally and without citing specific sources. The content of the 
right to health as outlined above, focusing on accessibility as a 
significant component, could and should have highlighted the 
effect of physical restrictions on the violation of this right. 
Moreover, even when applying IHL, the HCJ hardly turned to 
specific norms within it, although it did so in cases of protection 
during hostilities. The disappearance of international human 
rights considerations, including the limited turn to IHL, points 
to the prevalent form of analysis, especially in the Gaza cases. 
This analysis hinges on humanitarianism, in the sense of 
humanitarian gestures rather than of binding obligations 
derived from IHL, instead of on rights and duties. Law is more 
often absent than present, and the HCJ seems to favor 
pragmatic solutions, or no solution at all, rather than holdings 
based on principles. 
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The issues usually raised in courts where health rights are 
litigated did not feature in the cases before the HCJ reviewed 
here, probably because they do not pertain to the Israeli 
authorities but to Palestinian (and international) bodies 
providing health care in the OPT. Nor have the occupation’s 
more subtle detrimental effects on health care been a subject of 
litigation. These effects touch on the social and economic 
conditions created by the occupation and their long-term effect, 
but also on the violence of the occupation. Other issues that did 
become the subject of litigation—such as the legitimacy of the 
types of weapons used by Israel,466 or of “targeted killings” and 
their collateral effect,467 have a bearing on the life and health of 
Palestinians in the OPT, who may die or be injured because of 
these policies. Focusing on access to health care, then, as this 
Article did here, tells only a small part of the story of occupation, 
law, and health. Indeed, adjudication dealing with the conduct 
of hostilities in the OPT, even beyond that directly touching on 
the protection of medical teams and provisions of medical 
treatment, is no less relevant to the health of Palestinians living 
under occupation. 
But even regarding access to health care, we should 
acknowledge the limits of studying it through litigation. Paul 
Farmer points to the need for rethinking health and human 
rights in a way that will not pin all the hopes on legal battles 
and will instead shift to a paradigm of political solidarity and, 
pragmatically, to the provision of services for those in need.468 
Farmer says that a real transfer of money, food, and drugs is 
needed, rather than more litigation.469 In the present case, this 
 
 466. HCJ 8990/02 PHRI v. IDF Southern Command (Apr. 27, 2003), (Isr.) 
(concerning the legality of using flechette guns). 
 467. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (Dec. 14, 
2006), (Isr.). 
 468. PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR 213 (2003). 
 469. Id. See also Paul Farmer & Nicole Gastineau, Rethinking Health and 
Human Rights: Time for a Paradigm Shift, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 655–66 
(2002). For other sources on the limits of right to health litigation when bigger 
problems are involved, see Lucie White, “If You Don’t Pay, You Die”: On Death 
and Desire in the Postcolony, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS 57, 72 (Daphne 
Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007). See generally Jeremy Perelman & 
Lucie E. White, Stones of Hope: Experience and Theory in African Economic and 
Social Rights Activism, in STONES OF HOPE 149–71 (2011) (discussing robust 
social rights practice that uses litigation but does not privilege it and engages 
multiple public actors in every domain of state power, including both private 
and state actors). 
488 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2 
approach also pertains to the gap between the Palestinian and 
Israeli health systems as well as to the structural gaps (or, in 
Farmer’s term, the structural violence) at the heart of the 
issue.470 In Farmer’s words, human rights violations are not 
accidents but symptoms of deeper pathologies of power, and they 
are intimately linked to the social conditions that so often 
determine who will suffer abuse and who will be shielded from 
harm.471 Another factor to consider when addressing the limits 
of a litigation perspective is access to justice. Lack of access to 
the legal system or to lawyers, for reasons such as knowledge, 
means, and others, may indicate that litigation presents only 
part of the problem, without covering those who did not make it 
even to the threshold of the law. 
Haaretz journalist Amira Hass, who has documented the 
effects of restrictions on freedom of movement and their effect on 
health care,472 noted that Israeli authorities use the term 
“humanitarian” to describe their intervention in a way that 
allows them to beg the more rigorous questions surrounding the 
suppression of human rights.473 As Eyal Weizman, a professor at 
the University of London, points out, “humanitarian” has 
become the most commonly used adjective in matters of 
occupation design, with the army using such terms as 
“humanitarian terminals” and “humanitarian officers” in 
reference to checkpoints.474 Weizman describes how, in recent 
decades, governments have begun to describe their own projects 
as “humanitarian” and to use the term in any connection related 
to the provision of aid, including medical aid, even when 
undertaken by military or state agencies.475 At first glance, this 
description aligns with David Kennedy’s, a Harvard Law School 
professor, analysis of how, within humanitarian law, the 
humanitarians and the army often speak the same language, 
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since modern humanitarian law provides a professional 
vocabulary about objectives and means that civilized people can 
use to discuss military violence.476 Military commanders and 
humanitarians, says Kennedy, assess acts of violence from a 
similar vantage point and thus reinforce one another’s 
professionalism.477 Kennedy’s analysis pertains to the place of 
humanitarian lawyers and advocates vis-à-vis the military.478 
However, we should also note that while advocates for 
Palestinian health rights often use a language of rights, be they 
anchored in IHL or in international human rights law, many of 
the court judgments resort to a humanitarian language that is 
often “humanitarian without the law.” Courts may adopt an IHL 
means-ends proportionality analysis that actually obscures the 
wider picture of structural violence, inequality, and domination. 
These questions have tended to remain outside the judicial 
realm, though their effect on the right to health in its fullest 
sense has been critical. These HCJ decisions share with the 
military the language of proportionality without attempting to 
look in-depth at the structure of the occupation and without 
questioning the nature and legitimacy of the army’s concept of 
“security.” This humanitarianism, to borrow Kennedy’s analysis, 
participates in the occupation machine.479 
Frequently, however, humanitarian is not used in its 
denotation in IHL but as in humanitarianism, i.e. action that is 
done out of humanitarian concern and not IHL duty. As 
presented throughout this Article, in many of the cases 
pertaining to the right to health of Palestinians in the OPT, the 
HCJ has hardly made any reference to this right as a human 
right in international law and rarely mentioned specific 
obligations under IHL. Israeli courts tend to deal with OPT 
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474, at 143–259, 174–75. See also WEIZMAN, THE LEAST OF ALL POSSIBLE EVILS, 
supra note 474, at 3–4 (discussing how humanitarianism, human rights, and 
IHL, when abused by the state, have become the crucial means by which the 
economy of violence is calculated and managed). 
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Palestinians’ access to health care mainly as a humanitarian 
issue—again, not in the sense of binding obligations from IHL 
but in the sense of a humanitarian gesture—rather than as a 
matter raising questions of rights and duties. The 
humanitarianism of the army described by Hass and Weizmann 
seems to coalesce with the logic of these HCJ’s judgments. 
At the heart of the matter, then, is the occupation regime 
per se. Its health dimension reflects the larger structures of 
domination, the restrictions on freedom of movement, and the 
different regimes that populations living in the same area are 
subject to, including, in the present context, different health 
regimes. Israelis have access to the stronger Israeli health 
system, with the personal application of the NHIL to the 
settlers, and Palestinians in the OPT are excluded from it. 
Together with other factors, these circumstances lead to 
significant gaps between Israelis and Palestinians from the OPT 
in the health indicators and social determinants of health.480 Of 
course, the data for Israel includes Israeli settlers in the OPT 
whereas the data for the OPT applies only to the Palestinians. 
A recent report from PHRI Israel, which detailed this data, 
argued that pointing only to Israel’s specific responsibilities is 
no longer possible and full equality between Israelis and 
Palestinians must be demanded.481 At the time of writing, 
however, we seem to be far from such equality, and the litigation 
described in this article proceeds against the background of this 
inequality. Behind the legal accounts are the human stories of 
people who suffered, and sometimes died, because they could not 
access medical care on time. These people find themselves 
between the bureaucracy of the occupation on one hand and 
“proportionality” analysis on the other, with only 
“humanitarianism” rather than rights on their side. 
Bureaucratic procedures and proportionality analysis share an 
image of professional decision-making but, underlying them, is 
a regime of structural violence. As key features of the access to 
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health care and the law regulating it, bureaucracy and 
proportionality together with “humanitarian” acts may help to 
improve the situation for many Palestinians, as evident in the 
high percentage of approvals for exit permits requests. However, 
as discussed above, this percentage has been dropping, with 
delays and refusals leading to death in some cases. This Article 
points to the very idea that Palestinians are dependent on the 
discretion of Israeli military bureaucracy and are subject to its 
failures, rather than being accorded the human right of access 
to health care and to freedom of movement. This very problem is 
the core issue that appears to be beyond what litigation can 
change.  
